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Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of
Municipal Bankruptcy
Clayton P. Gillettet
Municipalities in fiscal distress may seek to adjust debts under Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code either because they are truly destitute or because they lack the political
will to adopt difficult resource adjustments. Local officials of municipalities that enter
bankruptcy proceedings nevertheless retain political authority over municipal fiscal
affairs. The decision to enter bankruptcy, however, may have significant financial
consequences for other municipalities or for more centralized levels of government.
Those externalities induce central governments to consider bailouts for distressed
municipalities. In order to avoid moral hazardproblems, central governments typically
impose harsh restrictionson local officials as a condition of bailout. This dual system of
rescue for distressed municipalities-bailoutsand bankruptcy-permits local officials to
threaten to file under Chapter9 and thus to impose costs on centralgovernments, unless
the latter modify the conditions of bailouts. In this Article, I suggest that allowing
bankruptcy courts to impose resource adjustments serves to neutralize the strategic
behavior of local officials and thus encourages localities to internalize the costs of their
activities in a mannermore consistent with the tenets offiscal federalism.
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INTRODUCTION

After an unfortunate investment in derivatives in the 1990s
caused substantial losses to the treasury of Orange County,
California, residents had the opportunity to facilitate exit from
bankruptcy by enacting a ten-year, half-cent increase in the county
sales tax.' They declined. They apparently preferred that losses be

borne by holders of debt secured by Orange County revenues,
which, in the absence of a tax increase, could prove insufficient to
pay debt service. In 2008, the city of Vallejo, California, filed for
bankruptcy in order to reject collective bargaining agreements, the
costs of which constituted $79.4 million of its $95 million budget.'

The district court noted that the city council had consistently refused
to seek electoral approval for tax increases, even though Vallejo had

the lowest sales tax in its geographic area.' In the summer of 2010,
the mayor of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, declared that the city would
default on a scheduled $3.3 million bond payment. To the argument
that the city could instead have cut services, the mayor responded,

"To disrupt [services] because we can't make a bond payment would
just be unconscionable.

And as a leader I couldn't do it."6

Harrisburg's city council subsequently rejected a proposed financial
recovery plan proffered under a state plan for distressed localities on

the grounds that it imposed too great a burden on taxpayers. When
the mayor and the state persisted in pursuing a bailout plan that
required the sale or lease of city assets, the city council voted to file
for bankruptcy.'
1 Mark Baldassare, When Government Fails: The Orange County Bankruptcy 151-60
(California 1998).
2 Id at 159-60.
3 In re City of Vallejo, 408 BR 280, 287 (BAP 9th Cir 2009). The city has recently
proposed a plan under which it would pay unsecured creditors between 5 and 20 percent of
their claims. See Randall Jensen, Vallejo Offers 5-20 Cents on the Dollar,Bond Buyer 1, 6 (Jan
20, 2011).
4 In re City of Vallejo, 2008 WL 4146015, *10, 12 (Bankr ED Cal).
5 Romy Varghese, HarrisburgSurrender: Why Pennsylvania's Capital Skipped Its Debt
Payment, Wall St J C1 (Sept 8, 2010).
6 Id (alteration in original).
7 See Paul Burton, HarrisburgRips Up Its Blueprintfor Recovery: Council Backtracks;
Mayor Eyes Moves, Bond Buyer 1, 6 (July 21, 2011).
8 See Michael Corkery and Kris Maher, CapitalFilesfor Bankruptcy: In Fight with State,
Harrisburg,Pa., Rejects Governor-Backed Plan to Sell Assets, Wall St J A3 (Oct 13, 2011). The

20121

Fiscal Federalismand Municipal Bankruptcy

These refusals of fiscally distressed municipalities to accept
higher taxes or reduced services (I will refer to these options
collectively as "resource adjustments") to satisfy obligations that
they have come to regret have multiple plausible explanations.' They
may reflect actual fiscal incapacity to pay existing obligations.
Resource adjustments, that is, could be self-defeating because any
such effort will generate sufficient exit by current firms and residents
that net revenues will actually decline.' Alternatively, failure to fund
obligations could be the consequence of an absence of political will
rather than of fiscal incapacity. Refusal to accept resource
adjustments may result from residents' justifiable indignation that
political officials incurred obligations in the locality's name
notwithstanding reasonable expectations that costs would ultimately
exceed municipal benefits. Both debts incurred to fund capital
projects that have proven burdensome (an incinerator in the case of
Harrisburg) and agreements to provide generous pensions to public
employees arguably fall within this category. Mark Baldassare
reports that substantial opposition to the Orange County sales tax
increase came from residents who viewed it as a means of paying for
the "mistakes" of county officials." While turning the responsible
officials out of office may provide a more highly targeted means of
chastisement, the binary nature of voting, the low likelihood that the
officials of distressed cities will run for reelection, and the common
perception that officials betrayed the trust of the electorate suggest
that residents believe repudiation of onerous obligations is
appropriate.
Perhaps less benignly, municipalities that could bear resource
adjustments may refuse to fund obligations because residents regret
having taken a risk that subsequently materialized and believe that
relief from another source-a more centralized government or the
creditors themselves-is plausible. Bailout or bankruptcy, that is,
may be seen as a viable alternative to resource adjustments. Eric
Monkkonen's study of late nineteenth-century municipal defaults,
bankruptcy court subsequently dismissed the bankruptcy petition on the grounds that the city
council lacked authority to commence the case and the city had not been specifically
authorized under state law to be a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code. In re City of Harrisburg,
2011 WL 6026287, *15 (Bankr MD Pa).
9 The examples above are not exhaustive of recent efforts to avoid debt. Residents of
Mount Clemens, Michigan, defeated a proposal to increase tax rates in November 2010,
notwithstanding the city's $1 million deficit. See Nick Bunkley, Debt Rising, a City Seeks
Donations in Michigan, NY Times A10 (Nov 20, 2010).
10 See Andrew Haughwout, et al, Local Revenue Hills: Evidence from Four U.S. Cities,
86 Rev Econ & Stat 570, 582-83 (2004).
11 See Baldassare, When Government Fails at 147-48 (cited in note 1).
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largely precipitated by overinvestment in railroad aid and other
"internal improvements," concluded that localities systematically
could afford to avoid default but preferred to impose the costs of
imprudently incurred obligations on creditors rather than to require
that residents bear them. 2
If municipal distress implicated little more than the relationships
between municipalities and their creditors, we might address the
issue as a variation on fiscal difficulties suffered by individuals or
firms. Indeed, that has been the approach of most of the literature
that has considered the provisions for municipal debt adjustment
under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code.'3 In this Article, however, I
contend that the options available to fiscally distressed municipalities
are properly examined under the lens of fiscal federalism, as well as
under standard perspectives on debtor insolvency, because the
conduct of municipalities necessarily affects the fiscal stability of
more centralized governments. Whether default on municipal debt
arises from fiscal incapacity or the absence of political will may
therefore have implications for the proper role of federal law and
federal actors in the face of threatened or actual default.
Specifically, fiscal federalism and the motivation for municipal
default have implications for the vexing issue of whether bankruptcy
courts can or should require resource adjustments for residents of
municipalities that seek to adjust their debts under Chapter 9.
Several years ago, Michael McConnell and Randal Picker proposed
that bankruptcy courts do indirectly what they could not do directly
by using the authority to reject or confirm a municipal debt
adjustment plan in order to induce the debtor municipality to levy
taxes on its residents, even if the same court had no authority to
order the same increase.'4 The McConnell-Picker suggestion was part
of their broader claim that municipal bankruptcy proceedings should
more closely resemble bankruptcy proceedings that relate to firms,
and that, in particular, they should include grants of power "to force
politically unpopular, but sensible, decisions such as elimination of
municipal functions, privatization, and changes in tax law,"'.5 or to
force more efficient forms of municipal organization.'6 Others
subsequently disagreed, though primarily with the proposed solution
12 Eric H. Monkkonen, The Local State: Public Money and American Cities 69-77
(Stanford 1995).
13 11 USC § 901 et seq (2008).
14 Michael W. McConnell and Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U Chi L Rev 425, 474 (1993).
15 Id at 472.
16 Id at 470.
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rather than with the problem of constraining municipalities from
strategically using bankruptcy to avoid the claims of creditors."
Omer Kimhi, for instance, would restrict the scope of bankruptcy to
avoid holdout problems and would leave rehabilitation efforts to
state political and financial processes,'8 while Kevin Kordana would
allow municipalities relatively free rein, within the confines of state
law, to make decisions about the propriety and costs of default,
constrained only by marketplace sanctions.'"
Because these analyses treat the potential federal and state
means of redress for municipal distress as independent alternatives,
they ignore the interactions between them. Federal bankruptcy and
federal or state bailouts allocate losses from municipal fiscal distress
differently. If debts are adjusted under federal bankruptcy law,
creditors bear much of the cost of fiscal distress, while municipalities
bear no obligation to alter the policies that generated the crisis. If
bailouts occur, creditors are more likely to recover their expected
payments; the loss will initially fall on the government that provides
funds, although the terms of the bailout may require repayment of
funds, reorganization of municipal functions, or both. Even within
the realm of bailouts, federal and state governments occupy very
different positions with respect to their capacity to dictate terms of
relief to distressed municipalities. States exercise plenary authority
over their political subdivisions and thus have broad legal authority
to create mechanisms to address fiscal distress." Both institutional
capacity and principles of federalism suggest that the federal
government is less able to monitor or dictate the performance of
municipalities.
But the fact that different avenues for dealing with municipal
distress impose different costs does not mean that the choice among
them in any particular situation will be optimal. To the contrary, the
availability of multiple options plausibly allows local officials to act
strategically in using or threatening to exploit alternative means of
relief. To the extent that they can select among alternatives, those
localities that lack political will rather than fiscal capacity may be
able to avoid affordable, if painful, resource adjustments. That
17 See, for example, Kevin A. Kordana, Tax Increases in Municipal Bankruptcies, 83 Va
L Rev 1035, 1106-07 (1997). See also Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to
Municipal FinancialCrises, 88 BU L Rev 633, 653 (2008).
18 See Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a
Problem, 27 Yale J Reg 351, 362-65, 385-89 (2010).
19 See Kordana, 83 Va L Rev at 1106-07 (cited in note 17).
See Lynn A. Baker and Clayton P. Gillette, Local Government Law: Cases and
20

Materials 237-48 (Foundation 4th ed 2010).
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possibility arises from the likelihood that the preferences of local
officials over the source and terms of relief differ from the
preferences of more centralized governments. For instance, if states
are relatively well positioned to deal with local fiscal distress, albeit
at some cost to local officials, it may be preferable to push localities
away from federal bankruptcy and into state programs. But if
bankruptcy is a plausible option for distressed municipalities, and a
more attractive one than centralized bailouts that constrain local
political authority, then local officials may use the threat of
bankruptcy to reduce the conditions that states place on a proposed
bailout. Indeed, local officials may be imperfect agents of their own
constituents and make decisions that serve personal political
objectives rather than the interests of either residents or the broader
public.
The strength of the municipal threat to act strategically depends
on the motivations of centralized officials to resolve municipal fiscal
distress. Those motivations emanate from numerous sources.
Centralized governments (both the state of which the municipality is
a subdivision and, in some cases, the federal government) may fear
that municipal default will implicate the budgets of other
municipalities or of the centralized governments themselves, either
because those other governments will be required to expend
resources to relieve the distressed locality or because distress of one
locality is perceived as a signal of imminent distress elsewhere.
Ideally, markets would distinguish between distressed and
nondistressed entities; nevertheless, there appears to be substantial
evidence of contagion that flows from distressed to healthy debtors.'
Alternatively, centralized governments may intervene out of fear
that municipal distress is sufficiently correlated with other economic
risks such that otherwise unproblematic municipal defaults would
trigger more systemic risks. Thus, for some localities and under some
circumstances, markets may perceive municipal obligations as
including an implicit guarantee that centralized governments will
take measures necessary to provide rescue in the event of fiscal
distress. Any implicit guarantee obviously assists the debtor
municipality in the form of lower interest rates for debt issuance. But
it simultaneously induces risk taking by municipalities, the downside
of which is borne by the guarantor. Failure of the centralized
21 See, for example, Mardi Dungey, et al, Contagion in International Bond Markets
during the Russian and the LTCM Crises, 2 J Fin Stability 1, 19 (2006); John M. Halstead,
Shantaram Hegde, and Linda Schmid Klein, Orange County Bankruptcy: FinancialContagion
in the Municipal Bond and Bank Equity Markets, 39 Fin Rev 293, 295-99, 313 (2004).
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government to satisfy expectations of rescue could then be viewed as
further evidence of widespread crisis.' Indeed, the problem creates
somewhat of an infinite regress, because the very likelihood of
centralized intervention induces localities to incur more and riskier
debts than would otherwise be the case, hence increasing the
likelihood that fiscal distress, and the need for centralized
intervention, will emerge. The result, however, is that central
governments that need to avoid "fiscal pollution" ' or systemic risks
can be vulnerable to the opportunism of local officials.
It is in this sense that fiscal federalism becomes an important
consideration in the resolution of municipal financial distress. As a
general proposition, fiscal federalism requires each level of
government to internalize both the costs and the benefits of its
activities.' Centralized governments should, therefore, subsidize
decentralized governments only to control negative spillovers of
local activity or to induce activities that generate positive spillovers.
Concomitantly, decentralized governments should be discouraged
from engaging in activities that impose adverse external effects. In at
least some cases of fiscal distress, however-primarily those
involving localities that have substantial state or national
importance-municipalities
can externalize some costs of
idiosyncratic choices or local public goods onto more centralized
levels of government or creditors. As a result, municipalities have
tendencies both to overgraze on the commons of more centralized
budgets and to avoid the exercise of political will to satisfy the debts
they incur. The current legal structure for addressing municipal fiscal
distress may interfere with, rather than advance, the objectives of
fiscal federalism insofar as it insulates local decisions from
centralized influence and reduces the need for distressed localities to
internalize the consequences of fiscal decisions. The result is that
while theories of federalism typically focus on the security that
decentralization confers against an onerous centralized government,"
22 See Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera, All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of
the FinancialCrisis 47-51 (Penguin 2010) (discussing how the market's treatment of privately
held, but federally chartered, government-sponsored enterprises allowed them to issue debt as
if it were supported by an implicit federal guarantee and induced the government ultimately to
intervene as if actual guarantees existed).
23
I thank Eric Posner for the felicitous phrase.
24 See Wallace E. Oates, Toward a Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism,
12 Intl Tax & Pub Fin 349, 350-54 (2005); David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism,
118 Harv L Rev 2544, 2571-79 (2005); Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism and the Use of
Municipal Bond Proceeds,58 NYU L Rev 1030, 1065-66 (1983).
25 See Oates, 12 Intl Tax & Pub Fin at 352-53 (cited in note 24). See also Super, 118 Harv
L Rev at 2556-58 (cited in note 24).
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the capacity of subnational governments to exploit the financial
strength of more central governments raises the possibility that the
latter require protection from the former. The claim of this Article is
that judicially imposed resource adjustments may be used as a means
of providing such protection by reducing the incentives of
municipalities to exploit bankruptcy proceedings strategically.
The next Part of this Article discusses the doctrinal background
for municipal bankruptcy. Part II introduces the nature of the fiscal
commons, the risk of financial contagion, and the interests of state
and federal governments in responding to fiscal distress in
decentralized jurisdictions. Part III develops the claim concerning
the incentives of distressed localities strategically to exploit
centralized jurisdictions and the capacity of federal bankruptcy
courts to neutralize that behavior. Part IV adds a brief note on the
application of the analysis to the current debate about permitting
states to file for bankruptcy under federal law.
I. THE DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND
It is tempting to treat the refusal of distressed municipalities to
adjust resources as little more than the implementation of an implicit
risk allocation in the original bargain between localities and their
creditors. Municipal governments, like other borrowers, receive
extensions of credit in return for a promise to repay principal with
interest. Typically, municipal bankruptcy is precipitated by actual or
imminent default on general obligation debts, in which that promise
is secured by the general tax revenues of the debtor municipality."
But promises to repay are subject to background legal rules and
contractual limitations. Even municipalities that have the capacity to
pay debts may be able to deploy those terms to avoid repayment.
Outside bankruptcy, some municipal debtors have successfully
contended that, under state law, a contractual pledge of their faith
and credit, which is typically incorporated into municipal promises to
repay debts payable from general taxes, means little more than an
obligation to exercise good faith in making payments." On this
26 See Robert S. Amdursky and Clayton P. Gillette, Municipal Debt Finance Law:
Theory and Practice 25-29 (Little, Brown 1992). See also Daniel Bergstresser and Randolph
Cohen, Why Fears about Municipal Credit Are Overblown *17-18 (unpublished manuscript,
June 2011), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1836678 (visited Nov
15, 2011).
27
See State v City of Lakeland, 16 S2d 924, 925 (Fla 1944) (en banc) (holding that a city's
pledge of "'full faith, funds, property, credit, and resources' did "no more, in legal effect, than
express an undertaking by the city to be irrevocably obligated, in good faith, to use such of its
resources and taxing power as may be authorized or required by law for the full and prompt
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understanding, if the locality can make payments only by reducing
essential services below a level of "public necessity," then residents

arguably prevail over creditors.'
Other jurisdictions have proven harsher. The New York Court
of Appeals rejected a state-authorized moratorium on payments of
New York City notes on the grounds that it conflicted with state
constitutional provisions that required debt service to be paid even if

constitutional tax limits had to be exceeded.' But in an era in which
mortgagors on underwater properties are encouraged to mail their
keys back to the mortgagee rather than continue to make payments,'
and distressed corporations obtain federal bailouts, there initially
seems little reason to distinguish cities that have been overly

optimistic about future revenues when investing in credit default
swaps, economic development, or collective bargaining agreements.'
If the background rules or contractual terms against which creditors

extended credit do not obligate the debtor to impose resource
adjustments, then no impropriety attaches to a decision to forgo

them; instead, that decision only constitutes an exercise of the option
created by the bargain, and one for which creditors were presumably

paid at the time that the bargain was struck.
A locality might avoid resource adjustments notwithstanding

default, for instance, where it has pledged to use tax revenues for
debt service only on satisfaction of certain conditions, even where
fulfillment of the conditions lies entirely within the its own
discretion. That has been the history of so-called "subject to
appropriation" debt, in which municipalities agree to pay debt
service for capital projects only if the local legislature makes the

necessary annual appropriation for that purpose. 2 It might seem

payment of the principal and interest of the obligation"). The court's conception of an
"undertaking," especially modified by the "good faith" limitation, arguably falls short of an
absolute promise of payment. Id at 925-26.
28 See, for example, DeFoe v Town of Rutherfordton, 122 F2d 342, 345 (4th Cir 1941).
29 See FlushingNational Bank v MunicipalAssistance Corp, 358 NE2d 848,851-52 (NY 1976).
30 See Brent T. White, The Morality of Strategic Default, 58 UCLA L Rev Discourse 155,
156 (2010), online at http:/luclalawreview.org/pdfldiscourse/58-8.pdf (visited Nov 13, 2011).
31 See Gretchen Morgenson, The Swaps that Swallowed Your Town, NY Times BU1
(Mar 7, 2010). See also Michael Cooper and Mary Williams Walsh, Mounting Debts by States
Stoke Fears of Crisis, NY Times Al (Dec 5, 2010); Leslie Wayne, Localities Want U.S. to
Support Muni Bonds, NY Times BI (May 26, 2009).
32 See, for example, Colleton County Taxpayers Association v School District of Colleton
County, 638 SE2d 685, 690 (SC 2006) (holding that a school district may incur general
obligation debt "provided the school district remains within the constitutional and statutory
limits"); Moschenross v St. Louis County, 188 SW3d 13, 20 (Mo App 2006):
The agreement in the present case was merely to request annual appropriations for
repayment of the bonds, subject to the approval of the county council. Therefore, the
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peculiar for creditors to grant such latitude to the debtor
municipality, unless the market perceives the promise to consider
appropriating funds as tantamount to a commitment to make the
necessary appropriations. Investors might view the form of the
transaction as necessary to satisfy legal requirements unrelated to
the payment obligation, such as the desire to circumvent state
constitutional debt limitations by removing a legal but not a practical
obligation to make payment. Investors could reasonably conclude

that a locality that initially financed capital projects in this manner
would continue to finance the debt primarily out of concern that it
would otherwise jeopardize its return to the capital markets.3 But if
no such obligation exists as a legal matter, it is also plausible that
localities would lack the political will to incur resource adjustments
for projects that turned out to be inopportune.' In the absence of a
legal obligation to pay the debt, there would be little reason for a

court to alter the bargain by requiring a distressed locality to make
such appropriations. The situation for municipalities' lenders would

be no different than that of a mortgagee who discovers that a
performance of the contract depends upon action by the county council before any
unconditional indebtedness arises. This is distinguishable from an absolute agreement to
incur debt, which has been determined to violate the debt-limitation provisions of Article
VI, section 26 of the constitution.
Drury v City of Cape Girardeau, 66 SW3d 733, 740 (Mo 2002) (en banc). The New Jersey
Supreme Court initially expressed skepticism about the propriety of the practice, noting that
the market treated "subject to appropriation" as the equivalent of general obligation debt to
which issuers have pledged their faith and credit. See Lonegan v State, 809 A2d 91, 101, 107-09
(NJ 2002). But the court subsequently determined that the constitutional debt limitation
applied only when the state is legally obligated to make payments. Lonegan v State, 819 A2d 395,
402-03 (NJ 2003).
33 See, for example, Lonegan, 809 A2d at 128 (Stein concurring in part and dissenting in
part), quoting Revised Lease and Appropriation-BackedDebt Rating Criteria1 (Standard & Poor's
June 12, 2001):
Finally, while appropriation-backed bonds are not considered debt under a strict legal
definition, Standard & Poor's considers all appropriation-backed bonds of an issuer to be
an obligation of that issuer and a failure to appropriate will result in a significant credit
deterioration for all types of debt issued by the defaulting government.
34 Indeed, that appears to be the issue in current litigation involving a default by the city
of Menasha, Wisconsin, on bond anticipation notes issued to finance a steam plant. The notes
were secured in part by the city's promise to appropriate funds out of its annual general tax
levy to pay any deficiency that resulted if the steam plant generated insufficient revenues for
debt service. But that promise was subject to annual appropriation from the budget, and the
city refused to make the requisite appropriation. The market presumably considers such debts
as mechanisms for avoiding constitutional debt limitations, but not a limitation on a general
obligation to pay debts, since any locality refusing to make payments would have difficulty in
subsequent borrowings. Nevertheless, Menasha apparently called the market's bluff. See
Yvette Shields, Investors: All Eyes on Menasha, Wis., Steam-Plant Lawsuit, Bond Buyer 5
(Sept 9, 2010).
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mortgagor in a nonrecourse jurisdiction, that is, one that disallows
personal actions against the mortgagor to recover any deficit
between the outstanding indebtedness and the value of the
foreclosed home, has decided to cease payments and pay the
statutorily designated liquidated damages of the value of the home,
notwithstanding financial ability to continue making payments. The
perceived failure of political will might cause consternation to future
residents when the locality sought to reenter the credit markets, but
fiscal prudence is not the measure of legal obligation.
The defaults that give rise to a municipality filing for debt
adjustment under Chapter 9, however, typically involve obligations
that allegedly cannot be paid as a financial matter, rather than
because of any contractual defense. 5 Where municipalities have
pledged their faith and credit to repay the defaulted debts, creditors
are likely to insist that resource adjustments be imposed to permit
payments." In the face of municipal recalcitrance, creditor success
depends in large part on the background rules of the bankruptcy
regime. In theory, a municipal bankruptcy regime could permit
judges to overcome any failure of political will and require localities
to adjust resources to pay affordable, if unpopular, obligations. As a
doctrinal matter, however, the existing bankruptcy regime appears to
preclude any such intervention. Section 904 of Chapter 9 explicitly
bars the court, without the consent of the debtor, from interfering
with the political or governmental powers of the debtor municipality,
any of its property or revenues, or its use or enjoyment of any
income-producing properties. 7 No court approval is necessary for the
municipality to continue to operate as its political leaders determine,
or even to borrow additional funds.
This noninterference principle implies that the objective of
Chapter 9 is simply to allow a financially distressed city to

35 Jonas Elmerraji, What Happens When Cities Go Broke? In a Tough Economy,
Bankruptcy Has Become a Dreaded-Yet Not Uncommon-Phenomenon, Even for Cities and
Municipalities, Forbes (July 2, 2010), online at http://www.forbes.com/2010/07/02/when-citiesgo-broke-personal-finance-municipal.html (visited Nov 13, 2011).
36
See, for example, In re City of Vallejo, 2008 WL 4146015, *6-7, 12, 16-18, 29-30
(Bankr ED Cal).
37 The relevant provision, 11 USC § 904, reads as follows:

Notwithstanding any power of the court, unless the debtor consents or the plan so
provides, the court may not, by any stay, order, or decree, in the case or otherwise,
interfere with(1) any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor;
(2) any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or
(3) the debtor's use or enjoyment of any income-producing property.
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restructure its monetary obligations, not to restructure the city
government or to liquidate its assets for the benefit of creditors.
More implicit signals exist to the same effect. Omer Kimhi has noted
that the absolute priority rule, which precludes junior creditors from
obtaining any payout in bankruptcy before senior creditors have
been fully satisfied, acts as a substantial check on shareholder
reluctance to pay creditors in corporate bankruptcy." The absolute
priority rule requires that shareholders pay the debts of both secured
and unsecured creditors in full before they can retain any of their
own interest in the firm. Although the absolute priority rule applies
in municipal bankruptcy as a formal matter," its application in that
setting has little of the constraining effect that it creates in corporate
bankruptcies. As Kimhi argues, since municipal residents are not
considered shareholders or creditors of the locality, their demands
for municipal services can be satisfied prior to creditors' demands for
payment without violating the priority of the latter." Residents,
therefore, can demand continued operation of fire, police, school,
and waste-disposal services before any municipal funds are dedicated
to creditors. Indeed, the likelihood that judges would refuse to
subordinate residents' interests in public services to the demands of
creditors may increase localities' ability to obtain concessions from
the latter. The effect is that municipal bankruptcy serves as a
mechanism by which localities can obtain the equivalent of the fresh
start available to individuals in bankruptcy, rather than the "efficient
reconfiguration of assets" characteristic of corporate bankruptcy."
The underlying assumption appears to be that localities should be
preserved in their current form, free from judicial reorganization,
notwithstanding that they thereby became financially overextended.
Perhaps the underlying rationale is that the alternative of dedicating
tax revenues to creditors, rather than to municipal activities, will
dilute residents' incentives to engage in municipally productive
behavior and will interfere with municipal officials' efforts to provide
the local public goods that justify municipal incorporation in the first

See Kimhi, 88 BU L Rev at 652 (cited in note 17).
See 11 USC § 901 (incorporating into Chapter 9 the absolute priority rule of 11 USC
§ 1129(b)(2)).
40
See Kimhi, 88 BU L Rev at 652 (cited in note 17).
41 See, for example, Martin Shefter, Political Crisis Fiscal Crisis: The Collapse and
Revival of New York City 106-07 (Columbia 1992).
McConnell and Picker, 60 U Chi L Rev at 468-70 (cited in note 14).
42
38

39
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instance." More doctrinally, some suggest that the noninterference
principle preserves the constitutionality of a federal bankruptcy law
directed at municipalities by minimizing the role of federal actors in
matters best left to state consideration."
But the apparently clear rule that the court may not require
resource adjustments becomes more opaque once one considers the
discretion that a court does have to condition the grant of relief in
Chapter 9 on the political will of residents to accept them. Judicial
discretion is apparent at various stages of the bankruptcy inquiry.
First, only municipalities that are "insolvent" can file for adjustment
of their debts." Chapter 9 (unlike the rest of the Bankruptcy Code)
involves a cash-flow test under which a municipality is "insolvent" if
it is unable currently or prospectively to pay its bills as they become
due.' The prospective element of the inquiry allows courts discretion
over the extent to which a municipality must deploy revenue-raising
capacity before it can claim inability to pay its debts as they become
due. For instance, the city of Bridgeport, Connecticut, failed the
"insolvency" test, even though it faced a $16 million deficit for its
current budget year, because it had access to a fund containing bond
proceeds sufficient to eliminate the deficit." Any withdrawals that
Bridgeport made from that fund, however, would have had to have
been repaid in future years, so that current withdrawals implied
subsequent use of the municipal taxing power to fund repayments.
The court might have agreed with Bridgeport that failure to provide
immediate relief simply deferred to the near future the city's
inability to generate revenues sufficient to meet all its obligations."
The court thus could have concluded that the prospective test was
satisfied. But the court instead required the prospective default to be
"imminent and certain," and concluded that the current availability
of assets precluded satisfaction of that test."

43 See Kimhi, 88 BU L Rev at 653-54 (cited in note 17) (explaining that both the court
and creditors are subject to the tax rates submitted by the municipality in its proposed
bankruptcy plan).
44 See, for example, In re New York City Off-Track Betting Corp, 427 BR 256, 264-65
(Bankr SDNY 2010); In re City of Vallejo, 403 BR 72, 75-76 (Bankr ED Cal 2009).
45 11 USC § 109(c)(3).
46
11 USC § 101(32)(C)(ii). See also In re City of Vallejo, 408 BR 280, 289-90 (BAP 9th
Cir 2009).
47 See In re City of Bridgeport, 129 BR 332, 337-39 (Bankr D Conn 1991).
48
Id at 337.
49
See id at 339.
50
Id at 337-38. For further discussion of the imminence requirement, see In re Hamilton
Creek Metropolitan District, 143 F3d 1381, 1386-87 (10th Cir 1998).
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The second point at which judicial intervention is plausible
involves the statutory provision requiring that a municipality seeking
the protection of Chapter 9 first engage in good faith negotiations
with creditors." At least one court has considered it appropriate to
take into account willingness to increase taxes when evaluating the
municipality's satisfaction of the good faith standard. In In re
Sullivan County Regional Refuse Disposal District,2 the court
concluded that districts composed of multiple municipal members
had not entered into good faith negotiations because the districts
failed to exercise their ability to assess their member municipalities
for unpaid service fees owed to creditors." Those assessments would
have been paid from taxes assessed by the member municipalities on
their residents. While the court concluded that Chapter 9 did not
require municipal debtors "to demonstrate that they have fully
exercised their taxing powers to the maximum extent possible,"
failure to exercise their assessment authority at all precluded their
assertion of good faith. 4
The third point at which judicial discretion can be exercised, and
the focal point of the McConnell-Picker argument, is at the stage of
confirming a plan for adjusting municipal debts. Confirmation is
permitted only if it serves the "best interests of creditors."5 Even if
all classes of creditors do not accept the municipality's proposal, a
court can confirm a plan that is "fair and equitable.""6 The "best
interests" and "fair and equitable" standards arguably are satisfied
only if the amount to be received by creditors under the plan is all
they can reasonably expect given the municipality's circumstances.
The relevant circumstances, however, arguably include the fiscal
capacity of the debtor to bear additional resource adjustments. The
classic case cited for judicial supervision of the "best interests"
standard in the municipal context is Fano v Newport Heights

51 11 USC § 109(c)(5)(B).
52 165 BR 60 (Bankr D NH 1994).
53 Id at 78-79.
54 Id.
55 11 USC § 943(b)(7). For an analysis of the "best interests" requirement and its
potential for use as a judicial tool, see McConnell and Picker, 60 U Chi L Rev at 465-67, 474-75
(cited in note 14). Other commentators have also noted the judicial discretion over municipal
resource adjustments inherent in determining whether the standard for confirmation has been
satisfied. See, for example, David L. Dubrow, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Viable
Option for Municipalitiesin Fiscal Crisis?, 24 Urban Law 539, 582 (1992).
56
11 USC § 1129(b)(1). This provision is incorporated into Chapter 9 by 11 USC

§ 901(a).
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57 In that case, a bondholder of a bankrupt
Irrigation District.
irrigation district appealed from a decree confirming a proposed
composition of indebtedness. The court concluded that even though
the district was insolvent in the sense that it did not have cash on
hand to pay interest, it was not insolvent "in the bankruptcy sense,"
as it owned "debt free" assets with a value that exceeded the
outstanding indebtedness. ' Those assets took the form of
improvements that the district had purchased with current funds that
could otherwise have been dedicated to the payment of debt service.
Thus, the court concluded, it would be "highly unjust" to require
bondholders to settle for two-thirds of the face value of the bonds, as
provided by the proposed composition. 9 But more to the point, the
court concluded that, as a practical matter, the district could have
increased taxes to pay debt service, and should have done so rather
than impose a loss on bondholders.' McConnell and Picker applaud
the result and conclude that the obvious need to interpret the
vagaries of the "best interests" or "fair and equitable" standard
implicitly authorizes judicial rejection of confirmation proposals that
exclude affordable tax increases.6 '
It is notable that in each of these cases the courts that exercised
discretion against the municipality have implied that allowing relief
under bankruptcy law was contingent on a finding that destitution,
rather than a lack of political will, was responsible for the locality's
failure to satisfy obligations. If it is inevitable that courts will use
their discretion to counter the absence of political will, then it is at
least worth considering whether to authorize such investigations
directly-that is, to repeal rather than circumvent the strictures of
§ 904. Explicitly permitting judicially imposed resource adjustments
might overcome objections that federal courts should not do
indirectly what they cannot do directly.62 Perhaps more importantly,

57 114 F2d 563 (9th Cir 1940). Fano was cited, along with Kelley v Everglades Drainage
District,319 US 415 (1943) (per curiam), in the legislative history of Chapter 9 to elucidate the
meaning of the "best interests" of creditors. See 124 Cong Rec 32403 (Sept 28, 1978) (Rep
Edwards). Commentators disagree on the extent to which those citations should control
application of the standard. Compare McConnell and Picker, 60 U Chi L Rev at 465-66 (cited
in note 14), with Kordana, 83 Va L Rev at 1060-66 (cited in note 17).
58 Fano, 114 F2d at 565-66.
59 Id at 564-66 (rejecting the district's plan on the basis that it had debt-free holdings
amounting to far more than the district's indebtedness).
60 Id at 565-66 (holding that the court was "unable to find any reason" why increased
taxes could not be levied to satisfy the debt).
61 See McConnell and Picker, 60 U Chi L Rev at 466 (cited in note 14).
62 Kordana, 83 Va L Rev at 1058-59 & n 116 (cited in note 17), citing Meat Cutters Union

Local 81 v NLRB, 458 F2d 794, 798 (DC Cir 1972).
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explicit grants would add to the transparency of the process, as
courts might more readily articulate their understanding of the
locality's fiscal position if they were acting according to an explicit
grant of authority than if they believed that they had to proceed by
stealth to deny relief to a strategically motivated locality. None of
this denies that courts may suffer from their own biases in evaluating
a municipality's financial position. Trying to determine the incentive
structure of judicial decision making is a notoriously difficult task.'
But if courts are already engaged in the activity, then short of finding
a way either to purify their processes or prevent them from
interpreting the conditions of Chapter 9 in light of political will (an
interpretation that may be perfectly appropriate), explicit
authorization of judicial intervention may be as desirable as it is
inevitable. Whether that is the case, I suggest below, depends more
on the capacity of judicial intervention to neutralize distortions that
the bankruptcy process currently invites than it does on concerns
about federalism that allegedly underlie the nonintervention
principle.
In that regard, it is worthwhile to note two other features of
municipal bankruptcy that might affect the incentives of the relevant
actors. First, municipal entry into Chapter 9 is conditional on state
consent, and that consent must "specifically authorize[]" the locality
to be a debtor under Chapter 9.' That does not mean that the state
must act separately with respect to each petition for bankruptcy. A
general statute that authorizes localities within the state to enter
Chapter 9, with or without conditions, will suffice.' A common, if
imprecise, test is found in In re County of Orange:' the purported
state grant of authority "must be exact, plain, and direct with welldefined limits so that nothing is left to inference or implication." 7
But provisions of state law that specify municipal powers without
63
For examples of academic attempts to analyze judicial behavior, see Frederick
Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinantsof JudicialBehavior, 68 U Cin
L Rev 615, 625-34 (2000); Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals
Process, 51 SMU L Rev 469, 478-91 (1998); Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and
Norms, 78 BU L Rev 813, 822-26 (1998); Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public
Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J Legal Stud 627, 630-32 (1994); Richard A. Posner,
What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 S Ct Econ
Rev 1, 31-41 (1993).
64 11 USC § 109(c)(2).
65
See In re County of Orange, 183 BR 594, 604-05 (Bankr CD Cal 1995). For examples
of general authorization statutes, see Cal Gov Code § 53760; Colo Rev Stat Ann § 32-1-1403;
NJ Stat Ann § 52:27-40.
66 183 BR 594 (Bankr CD Cal 1995).
67
Id at 604-05.
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authorizing filing for federal relief, such as general grants of home
rule, the right to sue or be sued, or the power to enter into contracts
or to incur debt will be inadequate. ' About half the states have
enacted statutes that appear to satisfy that standard.' One state has
explicitly prohibited its political subdivisions from using Chapter 9.'
The second doctrinal point is that, once state consent has been
given, the decision to file under Chapter 9 rests with the locality
alone. Creditors may not subject a municipality to Chapter 9
involuntarily and, given the language that a municipality can be a
debtor for bankruptcy purposes only if it "desires to effect a plan" to
adjust its debts, it appears that a state may not force one of its
municipalities into Chapter 9.2'
These restrictions on the availability of Chapter 9 affect the
relationship between a distressed municipality and more centralized
governments. But the two restrictions work in opposite directions.
The first suggests that the state retains complete control over fiscally
distressed municipalities, so that the latter cannot act strategically
with respect to states by threatening bankruptcy against a state that
desires to withhold that option. But the latter suggests that once the
state has allowed the option, its exercise lies wholly within the
discretion of the municipality. The capacity to control that decision
invites strategic behavior by the affected municipality. The next Part
discusses how the interactions between these restrictions may trigger
68 The language requiring that a municipality be "specifically authorized" to file under
Chapter 9, introduced in 1994, altered the previous requirement that a municipality be
"generally authorized" to take that action. See In re Allegheny-Highlands Economic

Development Authority, 270 BR 647, 648-49 (Bankr WD Va 2001).
69 See H. Slayton Dabney Jr, et al, Municipalitiesin Peril: The ABI Guide to Chapter9 95-111
(American Bankruptcy Institute 2010).
70 See Ga Code Ann § 36-80-5:
(a) No county, municipality, school district, authority, division, instrumentality, political
subdivision, or public body corporate created under the Constitution or laws of this state
shall be authorized to file a petition for relief from payment of its debts as they mature or
a petition for composition of its debts under any federal statute providing for such relief
or composition or otherwise to take advantage of any federal statute providing for the
adjustment of debts of political subdivisions and public agencies and instrumentalities.
(b) No chief executive, mayor, board of commissioners, city council, board of trustees, or
other governmental officer, governing body, or organization shall be empowered to cause
or authorize the filing by or on behalf of any county, municipality, school district,
authority, division, instrumentality, political subdivision, or public body corporate created
under the Constitution or laws of this state of any petition for relief from payment of its
debts as they mature or a petition for composition of its debts under any federal statute
providing for such relief or composition or otherwise to take advantage of any federal
statute providing for the adjustment of debts of political subdivisions and public agencies
and instrumentalities.
71 11 USC § 109(c).
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concerns from the perspective of fiscal federalism and therefore
license a more active intervention of federal bankruptcy courts than
§ 904 permits.
II. MUNICIPAL FINANCE AND MUNICIPAL EXTERNALITIES

A. Federal Relief and the Federal Fiscal Commons
Initially, the idea of federal intervention into municipal fiscal
affairs seems inconsistent with the conception of municipalities as
creatures of the state of which they are political subdivisions. It is the
states that can define the scope of municipal powers and thus that
can mandate actions to be taken either to avoid or redress municipal
fiscal distress.72 Federal intervention therefore might appear to
offend conceptions of federalism that generally exclude statemunicipal relationships from federal intrusion. Indeed, in upholding
the constitutionality of Congress's extension of federal bankruptcy
law to municipalities, the Supreme Court focused on the
requirement of state consent." The House report on the 1978 amendments to Chapter 9 indicated that the limitations of § 904 were
constitutionally mandated, and that the section "makes clear that the
court may not interfere with the choices a municipality makes as to
what services and benefits it will provide to its inhabitants." Others
have suggested that the requirement of state consent "ensures the
constitutionality of chapter 9.""
Of course, the discretionary provisions I have just discussed
imply that, congressional intent notwithstanding, the impropriety of
judicial interference is anything but clear. The McConnell-Picker
analysis suggests that the sacrosanct status of the nonintervention
principle is misguided. Instead, to the extent that municipalities serve
as efficient providers of local public goods, a relatively full panoply of
bankruptcy remedies that treat municipalities similarly to firms that

72
For an example of how a state creates local subdivisions, see Cal Gov Code § 23001.
For an example of how a state defines a county and grants counties with certain powers, see
Cal Gov Code §§ 23003-04. For an example of how states grant local public entities the ability
to file a petition for federal bankruptcy, see Cal Gov Code § 53760.
73 See United States v Bekins, 304 US 27, 47-53 (1938). The Court had earlier declared
such an extension unconstitutional. See Ashton v Cameron County Water Improvement District
No. One, 298 US 513, 527-32 (1936). It remains unclear whether the Bekins decision was
motivated more by a change in the statute or in membership of the Court.
74 See Bankruptcy Law Revision: Report of the Committee on the Judiciary Together with
Separate, Supplemental, and Separate Additional Views, HR Rep No 95-595, 95th Cong, 1st
Sess 398 (1977), reprinted in 1978 USCCAN 6354.
75 In re City of Vallejo, 403 BR 72, 75-76 (Bankr ED Cal 2009).
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provide private goods within an operating market-including
mandated resource adjustments-seems perfectly appropriate."
My emphasis here, however, is less on the efficient delivery of
municipal services than on fiscal federalism as a basis for justifying
rejection of the noninterference principle. We typically think of
federalism as encouraging an efficient level of sorting whereby those
who share preferences for a particular set of goods and services can
gravitate to a jurisdiction that provides them at a tax price that
residents are willing to bear." Fiscal federalism promotes sorting and
the efficient delivery of subnational public goods to the extent that it
involves autonomous decision making about revenue raising and
expenditures by decentralized states and localities.'6 The theory
implies that financial independence for decentralized governments
ensures that centralized policies do not impede satisfaction of local
preferences." But the negative implication is that fiscal federalism
precludes decentralized jurisdictions from externalizing costs of their
activities or demanding subsidies for goods and services that are
enjoyed solely within the locality, unless those subsidies are required
to encourage the production of benefits that spill over into other
jurisdictions. Any externalization of costs or subsidy of purely local
goods would disrupt the efficient delivery of services by other
(decentralized or centralized) jurisdictions or (in the case of
subsidies) would reduce the accountability of local officials, since
there would be little reason for residents to monitor the use of funds
that they did not provide. Moreover, fiscal federalism requires hard
budget constraints; that is, decentralized jurisdictions should be able
neither to print money nor to borrow without limit." In effect, the
benefits of federalism depend on the exercise of fiscal discipline, and
76
One might make a further claim: that either creditors or residents are in a better
position to monitor local fiscal behavior, and that thus the issue of relief should be structured
to make the loss fall on one of those parties. In other words, there should be no bailout for
creditors if they are in the best position to avoid distress, but full bailout should be possible for
creditors if local residents occupy that position. I have addressed that issue elsewhere. See
Clayton P. Gillette, Can Public Debt Enhance Democracy?, 50 Wm & Mary L Rev 937, 937,
987-88 (2009). Here, I assume that the centralized governments occupy that role, and I ask
how bankruptcy law affects the manner in which they play it.
77 This is the basis for optimal allocation of local public goods, as laid out in the classic
work on the subject, Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J Polit
Econ 416, 418 (1956) (indicating conditions under which potential residents could migrate to a
jurisdiction that offered their preferred public goods at an acceptable tax price).
78
For a discussion of the efficient localized delivery of public goods, see Oates, 12 Intl
Tax & Pub Fin at 352-56 (cited in note 24).
79
See Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Home Rule, 86 Denver U L Rev 1241, 1242-44 (2009).
80 For a discussion of the effects of externalizing the costs of localities' initiatives, see
Oates, 12 Intl Tax & Pub Fin at 354 (cited in note 24).
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that discipline exists only when there is intrajurisdictional
congruence of revenues (taxes) and expenditures.
Municipal financial distress involves several externalities that
plausibly interfere with these objectives of fiscal federalism. The first
is related to the fact that, in the absence of hard budget constraints
for localities, the budgets of centralized governments provide
common pools from which decentralized governments can draw
through debt issuance. Like any commons, centralized budgets are
prone to "overgrazing" by those decentralized entities that have
access to them, with potentially severe consequences for the central
government itself. To the extent that fiscal distress is generated by
municipal overextension of debt, the federal government necessarily
bears part of the burden. The reason is that municipal debt is
somewhat underwritten by the federal government, at least when
that debt is sold in the tax-exempt market. The tax exemption
creates a federal subsidy for municipal projects, even if the benefits
of those projects are enjoyed solely within the issuing jurisdiction."
Moreover, many observers conclude that the subsidy is an inefficient
one insofar as it causes losses to the federal treasury that exceed the
savings to the issuing municipalities.' The availability of the subsidy
provides municipal officials with incentives to incur more and riskier
debt than they would if they were paying the full cost, and
exacerbates other incentives that officials already have to overextend
the locality's credit."
Overgrazing on the tax exemption is further encouraged by the
absence of any need for federal approval before a locality can issue
tax-exempt debt and by the near absence of any significant federal
cap on the related tax expenditures. As I noted above, the hard
budget constraints that are essential to fiscal discipline at the

decentralized level entail limitations on borrowing. States impose
those formal limitations on their political subdivisions, but there is
broad consensus that the effect of those doctrinal limitations has
81 The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that the tax expenditure value of the
exclusion of interest on public-purpose state and local government bonds between the years
2010 and 2014 will be $161.6 billion. See Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal
Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2010-2014, Joint Comm Rep No 3-10, 111th Cong 2d Sess,
51 table 1 (2010), online at http://www.jct.gov/publications.htmlfunc=showdown&id=3717
(visited Nov 15, 2011).
82 See, for example, Peter Fortune, Municipal Debt Finance: Implications of Tax-Exempt
Municipal Bonds, in Gerald J. Miller, ed, Handbook of Debt Management 57, 88 (Marcel Dekker
1996).
83 Local officials have incentives to issue a greater-than-optimal amount of debt because
they receive immediate reputational and economic benefits from the construction of capital
projects but are less likely to be in office when projects prove unaffordable.
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been eviscerated.' Moreover, even local obligations that fall outside
the realm of constitutionally defined "debt" may be eligible for the
subsidy of the federal tax exemption.' Statutory restrictions on the
availability of the tax exemption in recent decades have addressed
this issue, but the availability of tax-exempt financing for projects
such as the new Yankee Stadium reveals that municipalities still have

access to federal subsidies for projects beyond basic governmental
capital expenditures, such as schools and courthouses, that one might
think the federal government has an interest in underwriting.'

Elimination of the tax exemption may be the most direct way to
address the issue. But political realities render that solution
unlikely.'
If local tendencies to become overextended implicate the
federal budget, and if fiscal overextension raises the risk that
municipalities will avail themselves of bankruptcy, then the federal
government has a plausible claim that it should play a role ex post
that compensates for its inability to control municipal exploitation of
the federal budget ex ante. The ability of municipalities to issue a
greater-than-optimal amount of debt and then to adjust those debts
to the detriment of creditors notwithstanding the capacity to bear
resource adjustments does little to discourage overgrazing on the

federal commons. In short, if federalism requires a significant federal
84 For a discussion of the ineffectiveness of debt limitations, see Richard Briffault,
Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution:State Fiscal Limits and State ConstitutionalLaw, 34 Rutgers
L J 907, 910, 920-25 (2003). See also Amdursky and Gillette, Municipal Debt Finance Law at
219-21 (cited in note 26); Robert H. Bowmar, The Anachronism Called Debt Limitation,
52 Iowa L Rev 863, 868-90 (1967). Widespread judicial acknowledgement that "subject to
appropriation" debt, discussed above, falls outside state constitutional debt limits serves as a
prime example of the diluted effect of debt limitations. See notes 32-34 and accompanying
text.
85
For instance, bonds secured by revenues generated by operation of a facility financed
with bond proceeds, such as a toll bridge, typically fall outside constitutional debt limitations.
See Amdursky and Gillette, Municipal Debt Finance Law at 181-88 (cited in note 26)
(describing how debt has been interpreted only to comprise obligations payable from the ad
valorem property tax). Nevertheless, interest on the bonds would satisfy the requirements for
the tax exemption if the funded facilities were governmentally owned and operated.
86 See IRS Private Letter Ruling No 110172-06, *2-3, 9-13 (2006) (available on WestLaw
at 2006 WL 2925866).
81 The recent demise of the Build America Bonds program indicates that elimination of
the tax exemption for municipal bond interest is unlikely to disappear soon. Bonds issued
under that program were issued on a taxable basis, with the federal government providing a
subsidy that reimbursed the local issuer for the additional costs that it incurred by virtue of not
issuing in the tax-exempt market. The bonds were typically seen as attractive, but the program
was allowed to expire at the end of 2010. See William Selway and Brendan A. McGrail, Build
America Bonds' End Poised to Batter Muni Market, Bus Wk (Dec 23, 2010), online at
http://www.businessweek.comlnews/2010-12-23Ibuild-america-bonds-end-poised-to-battermuni-market.html (visited Nov 15, 2011).
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interest before federal actors can intervene in matters of municipal
finance, the risk of municipal overgrazing on the federal commons
alone may satisfy that condition.
Centralized Relief and the Risk of Contagion

B.

The second externality of municipal fiscal distress is more
complicated but far more important for current purposes.
Notwithstanding limited federal controls on the amount and purpose
of local indebtedness that might generate subnational fiscal distress,
its materialization is likely to produce demand for bailouts from
more centralized governments. The reason lies in the risk of
contagion-the possibility that local distress is indicative of more
general fiscal difficulties or that unresolved local distress will cause
disruption in other markets, because the risks of one are
interconnected with risks elsewhere.
Municipal default precipitated by a discrete event that does not
signal broader economic risks is unlikely to trigger demands for
rescue by either the federal government or the state of which the
debtor is a municipality. Most recent municipal defaults have been of
this nature, generated by a large tort judgment or the inviability of a
single-purpose public authority such as an irrigation district or
hospital district.' But it is plausible that even an idiosyncratic default
by a single, but significant local government would trigger demands
for centralized intervention out of fear that an unresolved default
would have contagion effects that threaten the stability of
neighboring jurisdictions, the state, or even the nation. That appears,
for instance, to have been the case when the New York Urban
Development Corporation, an agency of New York State created to
finance construction of affordable housing in low-income areas,
defaulted on its securities in 1975. Housing agencies in other
municipalities were unable to market their bonds or were required to
pay interest rates significantly higher than anticipated prior to the
default. Other New York State agencies that had no relation to
housing suffered similar consequences. " Defaults within a limited
period of time by multiple municipalities of even moderate size
could similarly generate calls for centralized intervention in order to
limit the consequences of perceived systemic distress. Press reports
indicate a similar phenomenon, and the assumption of implicit
See, for example, Kimhi, 27 Yale J Reg at 360 (cited in note 18).
See Seymour P. Lachman and Robert Polner, The Man Who Saved New York: Hugh
Carey and the GreatFiscal Crisis of 1975 89 (SUNY 2010).
88

89
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centralized guarantees, when the state of Alabama proposed to
intercede with bond issues and guarantees in an ultimately
unsuccessful effort to stave off bankruptcy filings by Jefferson
County. The governor apparently approved the proposal because the
state's failure to assist might "unnerve investors considering bonds
issued by other Alabama towns and counties, and even the state
itself."'
In theory, contagion should not occur because investors will
distinguish financially healthy jurisdictions from distressed ones. But
markets, especially those suffering from the relatively low level of
disclosure that characterizes the municipal securities market, may
lack the efficiency necessary to allow perfect segmentation.9'
Investors might, therefore, treat the default of a substantial
municipality or of multiple municipalities as a signal of new and
unfavorable information about systemic municipal fiscal instability.
Indeed, given the lessons from the recent fiscal crisis about the
interconnectedness of risk, centralized governments might feel some
obligation to forestall municipal defaults in order to avoid
perceptions of more general fiscal fragility in the economy that could
result if default by a municipality imposed risks on private entities,
such as local banks.
Contagion, moreover, could materialize even if the market is
incorrect about the significance of a singular default. Contagion is a
consequence of a perception that one municipality's default would
generate external effects, not of the fact that those effects would
necessarily materialize. Those perceptions are likely to be promoted
by representatives of the distressed locality in their efforts to procure
some form of bailout. Notwithstanding resistance to bailouts from
nondefaulting jurisdictions, geographically widespread defaults
would tend to increase the likelihood of intervention, as centralized

90 Mary Williams Walsh and Campbell Robertson, Just before Deadline, County in
Alabama Delays Bankruptcy Move, NY Times B1 (July 29, 2011) (explaining that Jefferson
County was in financial trouble because of mismanaged sales of debt to finance a sewage
system renewal project and that the governor was considering helping the county secure access
to additional funds because he feared the negative repercussions of a default). Notwithstanding
the proposals, Jefferson County ultimately did file for bankruptcy after negotiations with
creditors reached an impasse. See In re Jefferson County, 2012 WL 32921, *11 (Bankr ND
Ala); Mary Williams Walsh, Alabama Governor Fails to Prevent County's Record $4 Billion
Bankruptcy Filing,NY Times A16 (Nov 10, 2011).
91 For a discussion of the relatively low level of disclosure in the municipal securities
market, see Theresa A. Gabaldon, Financial Federalism and the Short, Happy Life of
Municipal Securities Regulation,34 J Corp L 739, 746-52 (2009).
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lawmakers would be more likely to represent jurisdictions that are in
or are at risk of defaultY
The empirical evidence about fiscal pollution from local distress
is mixed but offers some support for the presence of contagion.
Edward Gramlich found evidence of contagion from New York's
near default in the mid-1970s.93 David Kidwell and Charles Trzcinka,
however, found that any New York City effect on interest rates was
both small and brief.' John Halstead, Shantaram Hegde, and Linda
Klein found that neighboring jurisdictions suffered an increase in
interest rates after Orange County's default, even though that event
was caused by a discrete set of ill-advised investments and
bondholders ultimately were fully paid.' They also find negative
returns for municipal bond funds that had no exposure to Orange
County.' But their study follows returns for no more than eight days
after the announcement of Orange County's bankruptcy, so it is
unclear whether long-term contagion existed. Kristin Stowe and
M.T. Maloney concluded that neighboring localities pay a risk
premium after a municipal default, though not as large of one as the
defaulting municipality." Outside the municipal market, Mardi
Dungey, Ren6e Fry, Brenda Gonzdilez-Hermosillo, and Vance
Martin find some contagion from defaults in international bond
markets, while Christopher Ma, Ramesh Rao, and Richard Peterson
find little fiscal externality from the LTV Corporation default."
The few recent instances of imminent default by major cities
provide some additional evidence that centralized governments that
intervene in the face of municipal fiscal distress are motivated largely
by a perception of contagion risk. Recall that, notwithstanding
President Gerald Ford's much-publicized antipathy toward federal

92
See Erik Wibbels, Bailouts, Budget Constraints, and Leviathans: Comparative
Federalism and Lessons from the Early United States, 36 Comp Polit Stud 475, 488 (2003).
93 See Edward M. Gramlich, New York: Ripple or Tidal Wave? The New York City Fiscal
Crisis: What Happenedand What Is to Be Done?, 66 Am Econ Rev 415, 423-26 (1976).
94 See David S. Kidwell and Charles A. Trzcinka, Municipal Bond Pricing and the New
York City Fiscal Crisis, 37 J Fin 1239, 1246 (1982).
95
See Halstead, Hegde, and Klein, 39 Fin Rev at 293, 313 (cited in note 21).
96
Id at 294, 313.
97 Kristin Stowe and M.T. Maloney, The Response of the Debt Market to Municipal
FinancialDistress *20-21 (unpublished manuscript, Jan 2005), online at http://myweb.clemson.edu
/-maloney/papers/muni-financial-distress.pdf (visited Nov 16, 2011).
98 Dungey, et al, 2 J Fin Stab 19 (cited in note 21).
99 Christopher K. Ma, Ramesh P. Rao, and Richard L. Peterson, The Resiliency of the
High-Yield Bond Market: The LTV Default, 44 J Fin 1085, 1085-86, 1096 (1989).
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relief during New York City's financial crisis in 1975," the federal

government ultimately responded to the city's impending filing for
bankruptcy by extending loans with presidential approval in order to
avoid the implications of default.'1° Congressional testimony at the
time predicted that a New York City default would increase
borrowing costs across the public sector, reduce spending, and

increase tax rates."' Former New York governor and then-Vice
President Nelson Rockefeller argued that a New York City default
would have unpredictable but serious consequences for efforts by

other municipalities to enter the capital markets."3 Martin Shefter
concludes that "if New York City had defaulted on its $11 billion in
outstanding debts, serious damage might have been done to the
national and international banking systems."" Ester Fuchs similarly
concludes that federal relief was forthcoming only after the City's
near default affected international bond and currency trading and
increased borrowing costs for other municipalities."' As New York

State wrestled with legislative approaches to the city's crisis, the
governor's budget director warned that the state would default
within thirty days of a city bankruptcy, due largely to the state's
obligation to absorb the costs of providing welfare to one million
recipients. "' The state also argued to recalcitrant legislators that
bondholders would not discriminate between city and state
100See Gerald R. Ford, Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at the National
Press Club on the Subject of Financial Assistance to New York City (Oct 29), in 1975 Pub
Papers 1729, 1733.
101 See New York City Seasonal Financing Act of 1975, Pub L No 94-143, 89 Stat 797
(1975), codified at 31 USC § 1501 et seq (1976). See also Gerald R. Ford, Statement on
Measures Taken to Improve the Financial Situation of New York City (Nov 26), in 1975 Pres
Pub Papers 1902, 1904.
102 See, for example, Impact of the New York City Fiscal Crisis on the Federal Budget,
Special Hearing before the House Committee on the Budget, 94th Cong, 1st Sess 18-22 (1975)
(testimony of Otto Eckstein, President's Council of Economic Advisors).
103 See Lachman and Polner, Hugh Carey at 147-48 (cited in note 89).
104 Shefter, Political Crisis at 128 (cited in note 41). See also Jonathan Soffer, Ed Koch
and the Rebuilding of New York City 117 (Columbia 2010):
International pressure and a growing realization that the bankruptcy of the nation's
largest city would undermine confidence in the dollar and the U.S. economy, as well as
implementation of the control board's fiscal and management reforms and destructive
across-the-board budget cuts, led Congress to pass a "rescue" package of so-called
seasonal loans.
Soffer notes, however, that much of the federal resistance to aid for New York City was
predicated on a concern that providing aid would require rescues for other cities as well. See id
at 113, 117.
105 Ester R. Fuchs, Mayors and Money: Fiscal Policy in New York and Chicago 90
(Chicago 1992).
106 See Lachman and Polner, Hugh Carey at 132 (cited in note 89).
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securities, but would instead search for alternative tax-shelter
investments."'
New York City may have greater national significance than
other cities, both because of its size and its importance to the
financial sector of the economy, and thus be relatively well
positioned to demand bailouts from the federal government. Those
differences, however, may be in degree, not in kind, since fiscal
distress in other localities could still motivate centralized bailouts.
Thus, fiscally distressed localities may have sufficient status within
their states to extract a state bailout, even if they cannot obtain a
federal one. Recent forecasts of imminent widespread municipal
bankruptcy in the face of declining property values and property tax
collections frequently include an argument that a federal bailout
would be appropriate, if not inevitable." The European Union's
recent efforts to avoid defaults by relatively small member states
such as Greece and Portugal similarly demonstrate that centralized
governments have concerns about contagion effects.
In short, rational investors in municipal obligations would
expect centralized governments to bail out fiscally distressed
localities when the adverse consequences of default due to contagion
or fear of systemic risk exceed the centralized bailout costs. The
political economy of bailout, however, may induce intervention even
before that point is reached."' Current local officials may favor
federal or state bailouts because they permit localities to meet
obligations without immediate use of local funds, while repayment of
any bailout funds will occur in the future and thus be a burden to
later officials. Local officials are likely to be concerned that the
personal price of bailout involves the surrender of their authority
over municipal functions."' But that bias does not necessarily mean
that they will reject bailouts; instead, it could mean that local officials
with a plausible claim that default will have national effects will
prefer a federal bailout. Although any government that bails out the
locality is likely to demand concessions as a price of intervention, the
federal government may demand fewer concessions than the state,
Id.
Even at the early stages of what was seen as an impending crisis in municipal debt,
Representative Barney Frank explicitly advocated some form of federal guarantee for
municipal debt. See Andrew Ackerman, Treasury, Fed Eye Guaranty for Munis, Bond Buyer
(May 19, 2009), online at http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/118_95/-303539-1.html (visited Dec
29, 2011).
109 See Saul Levmore, Coalitionsand Quakes: Disaster Relief and Its Prevention, 3 U Chi
Roundtable 1, 17 (1996).
110 See, for example, Fuchs, Mayors and Money at 88 (cited in note 105).
107
108
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both because the federal government has less legal authority over
municipalities and less capacity to monitor them than the state. For
example, while the federal Seasonal Financing Act,"' which
permitted federal loans to New York City in 1975, required
earmarking of city revenues for loan repayment and periodic
reporting by the city, the federal government did not seek to take
over any of the financial affairs of the city."' Repayment of funds to
the federal government would likely be deferred to the distant future
when current officials are less likely to hold office.
Moreover, creditors will prefer federal bailouts to bankruptcy
because bailouts will likely permit full satisfaction of obligations
more readily than bankruptcy, which would permit adjustment of
debts at the creditor's expense. States might favor federal bailouts
because they allow relief without expenditures of state funds.
Jurisdictions that anticipate impending fiscal crises of their own
might similarly prefer a federal bailout in order to set a precedent of
which they could take advantage. Thus, those who favor federal
bailouts would tend to come from relatively small, concentrated
groups of officials and creditors who have the capacity and interest
to organize to obtain relief. All these incentives translate to the state
level if appeals for federal bailouts are unavailing. That is, despite
concerns that states will demand more intrusive concessions than the
federal government, local officials and creditors will seek bailouts
from the state,"' and municipalities within the state that anticipate
imminent difficulties of their own will be reluctant to object, since
they may want to take advantage of the precedent in the near future.
Organizational advantages could enhance the claims of those
who favor bailouts. The jurisdictions that seek bailouts would
presumably obtain a substantial benefit from centralized
intervention and thus have a very intense preference for centralized
intervention. Since fiscal distress tends to be readily observable,
distressed municipalities can self-identify in a manner that facilitates
collective action in lobbying. Those who object to bailouts would
comprise taxpayers from jurisdictions who neither anticipate a need
for fiscal relief nor want to dedicate their tax dollars to ostensibly
profligate municipalities. But the relatively small per capita expenditure

I1IThe New York City Seasonal Financing Act of 1975, Pub L No 94-143, 89 Stat 797
(1975), codified at 31 USC § 1501 et seq (1976) (expired 1978).
112 See Donna E. Shalala and Carol Bellamy, A State Saves a City: The New York Case,
1976 Duke L J 1119, 1131.
113 For a discussion of the interplay between local officials' willingness to accept state
bailouts and the future responsibilities of the obligation, see text accompanying footnotes 120-21.
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that taxpayers from those jurisdictions would suffer from any bailout is
likely to discourage collective action to oppose central intervention.
That may especially be the case if the precipitating event is seen as
nonrepeating so that assisting the victims is not seen as a precedent
for subsequent demands."4 This is not to say that the central
government will necessarily bail out distressed decentralized
governments. It is only to say that, barring some constitutional
precommitment device, it is essentially impossible for central
governments credibly to commit not to bail out insolvent
decentralized governments.
C.

The Primacy of State Intervention

Even where municipal distress triggers sufficient consequences
to justify central intervention, however, it is not clear that direct
federal intervention is either necessary or the best strategy. Indeed,
the federal government has rarely employed bailouts with respect to
local governments. In the past several decades, fiscal crises in
Philadelphia, Bridgeport, Miami, Orange County, Cleveland, and
Camden "5 were all addressed without federal fiscal intervention."6
Only in New York City "7 and Washington, DC, "' did federal bailouts
materialize. Instead, states have proven to be the providers of relief,
either by advancing payments, extending loans, or appointing
financial control boards that could exercise municipal authority. One
might contend, therefore, that the risk that municipal default will
have substantial federal impact is too small to warrant federal
bankruptcy court imposition of resource adjustments.
But the absence of federal bailout does not entail the absence of
federal risk or federal interest in the situations that I have

114 See Levmore, 3 U Chi Roundtable at 4 (cited in note 109). Intervention may become
more controversial when its targets are generalized. Note, for instance, the demands of some
that the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund be extended to include victims of the
1993 World Trade Center bombing and the Oklahoma City bombing. See, for example,
Kenneth R. Feinberg, Speech: Negotiating the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund of
2001: Mass Tort Resolution without Litigation, 19 Wash U J L & Policy 21, 28 (2005).
115 See Actions Taken by Five Cities to Restore Their FinancialHealth, Hearing before the
Subcommittee on the District of Columbia of the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight, 104th Cong, 1st Sess 2 (1995) ("Five Cities Hearings").
116 See, for example, Robert P. Inman, Transfers and Bailouts: Enforcing Local Fiscal
Discipline with Lessons from U.S. Federalism, in Jonathan Rodden, Gunnar S. Eskeland, and
Jennie Litvack, eds, Fiscal Decentralizationand the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints 35,
59 (MIT 2003); Five Cities Hearingsat 2 (cited in note 115).
117 See notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
118 District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995,
Pub L No 104-8, 109 Stat 97, 121
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suggested-that is, where risks related to municipal defaults are
interconnected with other risks in the economy or where multiple
defaults occur simultaneously. Direct federal intervention in those
situations may be forestalled because states can intervene to the
staunch the local crisis."9 States, after all, are the best first responders
to municipal fiscal distress because their authority over their political
subdivisions provides them with a broader range of possible
reactions than is available to the federal government. But the
existence of federal interest where municipal default signals more
systemic risks means that the federal government should be able to
intervene at least to ensure efficient state implementation of its
superior control over municipal distress.
The need for federal involvement in state processes is evident
from examination of the downside effects of municipal distress on
the states. The prospect of relief from the state exacerbates any
incentives that local officials might have for overborrowing as a
result of federal tax exemptions and dilutes the discipline that
municipalities might exercise due to the relatively low probability of
federal bailouts. Contagion effects are more likely within the more
concentrated area of the state, and states will tend to have
economies that are less diversified than the federal economy. As a
result, a local fiscal crisis is more likely to signal intrastate instability,
and thus to induce state intervention, even with respect to
municipalities that are small enough to fail from the federal
perspective. Local officials, therefore, are more likely to look to state
bailouts than to federal ones.
The more intense state concern does not necessarily mean that
state rescues will take the form of a free bailout. Rather, states are
likely to take measures that range from loans or advances of general
state aid to formal takeovers of municipal government.'2" Indeed,
Robert Inman claims that state intervention has typically taken the
form of temporary loan guarantees rather than the injection of new
money. 2' Nevertheless, from the perspective of local officials the
effect of these interventions is largely the same. If funds need not be
repaid until the distant future, local officials who can obtain current
relief from financial distress are likely to discount the local effects of
the corresponding obligations. This means not only that the
119 See, for example, Five Cities Hearingsat 2 (cited in note 115).
120 See, for example, Fla Stat Ann §§ 218.50-218.504; NY Local Finance Law § 85.80;
Note, Missed Opportunity: Urban Fiscal Crises and FinancialControl Boards, 110 Harv L Rev 733,
734 (1997).
121 Inman, Transfers and Bailouts at 60-61 (cited in note 116).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[79:281

incentives that induce excessive local borrowing remain in place. It
also means, as developed below, that the terms of the state bailout
are likely to be driven by interactions between state officials and
local officials with very different preferences about the desirability
and conditions of rescue.
D. The Consequences for Central Governments of Potential
Bailouts
Divergent preferences of state and local officials might not
warrant federal bankruptcy court attention if the consequences had
insubstantial effects on the stability of centralized budgets. But the
prospect of bailout is widely viewed as creating moral hazard
because it induces localities to incur debt that places on more
centralized governments a risk that they cannot (in the case of the
federal government) or do not (in the case of states) control, because
central governments do not effectively limit decentralized
obligations. This local manifestation of centrally created moral
hazard belies the longstanding assumption in the literature of fiscal
federalism that decentralized decision making and interjurisdictional
competition will foster fiscal responsibility and efficiency in the
delivery of public goods.'22 Instead, the inability of centralized
governments credibly to commit against bailout suggests that
subnational governments can distort the fiscal policies of national
governments. That conclusion is consistent with recent literature that
analyzes how the inability of central governments to control local
debt for which it has at least implied responsibility causes substantial
overspending and inefficiencies at both national and subnational
levels. " Francesca Fornasari, Steven Webb, and Heng-fu Zou
conclude from an examination of both developed and developing
nations that subnational spending and deficits can lead to higher
spending and deficits at the national level." Timothy Goodspeed
develops a model in which national officials increase consumption,
and thus the probability of reelection, by granting bailout transfers to
122 See, for example, Oates, 12 Intl Tax & Pub Fin at 355 (cited in note 24); Yingyi Qian
and Barry R. Weingast, Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives, 11 J
Econ Persp 83, 88-90 (1997).
123 See Jonathan A. Rodden, Hamilton's Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal
Federalism 271-72 (Cambridge 2006); Daniel Treisman, The Architecture of Government:
Rethinking PoliticalDecentralization 141-46 (Cambridge 2007); Erik Wibbels, Federalism and
the Politics of Macroeconomic Policy and Performance, 44 Am J Polit Sci 687, 698 (2000);
Francesca Fornasari, Steven B. Webb, and Heng-fu Zou, The Macroeconomic Impact of
DecentralizedSpending and Deficits: InternationalEvidence, 1 Annals Econ & Fin 403,404 (2000).
124 Fornasari, Webb, and Zou, 1 Annals Econ & Fin at 404 (cited in note 123).
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overextended subnational governmental debtors. The likelihood of
such transfers encourages subnational governments to engage in
inefficiently high levels of borrowing.'" Jonathan Rodden suggests
that Germany's combination of local discretion over borrowing and
dependence on the central government for revenue creates an
implied guarantee of federal bailouts that induces overexpenditure
at the local level.'" The effects in the United States may not be as
pronounced because states and localities may have more authority
over their own budgets. But the possibility that the linkage between
local default and national distress is not as great in the United States
does not imply that there is no significant effect.
Any effects of municipal bailouts on centralized budgets are
likely to be amplified by a variety of factors. First, the rescuing
government has less capacity to recoup the benefits of a bailout of
municipal corporations than of private firms that the government
deems too big to fail. In the latter cases, the government may be able
to take back a residual claim in the firm, so that it enjoys the rewards
of the rescue effort.'27 Since municipal corporations have no residual
owners, the most that the federal government can obtain is
repayment of funds made available for the rescue effort. Any
additional upside to the rescue is enjoyed by the municipality alone."
Nor, in the case of federal bailouts, is it likely that the federal
government would be able to extract from the municipality any
organizational changes that could prevent further municipal distress,
since the powers of municipalities are traditionally seen as dictated
by state law.
Second, as Inman suggests, the prospect of bailouts creates a
prisoner's dilemma logic: since citizens of the central government
must participate in the bailout of any distressed locality, each locality
has incentives both to take the risks that generate the need for
federal bailouts and then to seek bailouts when those risks
materialize. The cost of bailing out any locality is shared throughout
the central jurisdiction, and bailout of a distressed locality offsets the
contribution that its taxpayers make to other bailouts.'29 Even self125 See Timothy J. Goodspeed, Bailouts in a Federation,9 Intl Tax & Pub Fin 409,415 (2002).
See Rodden, Hamilton's Paradoxat 153-87 (cited in note 123).
See Maya Jackson Randall, Fed's Net Soars on Crisis-EraHoldings, Wall St J A2 (Jan
11,2011).
128 In theory, the federal government could purchase the depressed debt of the distressed
municipalities and sell that debt at a profit once the local economy stabilized.
129 See Inman, Transfers and Bailouts at 39-41 (cited in note 116); Robert P. Inman,
Transfers and Bailouts:Institutionsfor Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline, 12 Const Polit Econ 141,
145 (2001).
126
127
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interested residents of a municipality would find it rational to
overgraze on the central fiscal commons as long as borrowing and
default risk is subsidized.
Finally, local officials already suffer from numerous incentives
to incur substantial debt, and the likelihood of bailout can aggravate
those incentives towards riskier borrowing. Debt is used primarily to
fund capital projects. Many of these projects pose substantial
municipal risks because their long-term viability is questionable.
Local convention centers, stadiums, incinerators, power plants, water
works systems, and the like constitute bets about the preferences of
future residents, future regulatory regimes, and the future
availability of alternative sources for the same good or service that
the locality proposes to provide. Local officials, however, are likely
to be risk-preferring agents with respect to these choices because the
benefits of the project (local jobs, attractive new structures, promises
of local economic nirvana) can be realized in the short term, while
many of the costs can be deferred to future residents (assuming that
future debt costs are not fully capitalized into current property
values). As a result, local officials are likely to place even bad bets,
because they will likely be out of office when the inappropriate
projects in which they invest are recognized as such, while they
receive immediate benefits from the gains of job creation and civic
pride inherent in capital projects.
Local spending of a greater-than-optimal amount for capital
projects is plausible even with respect to good bets. Typically, when
local voters exercise input on individual capital projects, such as
through bond elections, they are limited to a binary vote for or
against the issue. They do not have any discretion about project
scale. The Romer-Rosenthal hypothesis predicts that voters will
approve projects that are overfunded, as long as the overfunding
does not exceed the loss that the median voter would suffer if the
project were not funded at all.'30 Local officials can, therefore,
propose and obtain approval for projects even though the personal
benefits of the project costs surpass social value.
The result of these effects is that central governments face a
difficult choice when local fiscal distress arises. Bailouts create moral
hazard and impede efforts to impose fiscal discipline on localities.
Bailouts violate the underpinnings of fiscal federalism by imposing
130 Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal, Bureaucrats versus Voters: On the Political
Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy, 93 Q J Econ 563, 564 (1979). For an
application of the Romer-Rosenthal hypothesis, see Clayton P. Gillette, Direct Democracy and
Debt, 13 J Contemp Legal Issues 365, 367 (2004).

2012]

Fiscal Federalism and Municipal Bankruptcy

on nonresidents the costs of decisions made solely by local officials.
Nevertheless, allowing default can create the type of fiscal pollution
that requires even more significant central intervention later and that
risks imposing significant costs on centralized budgets. Under these
circumstances, one might imagine that the best strategy for the
central government would be to provide a bailout, but one
accompanied by conditions sufficiently stringent to deter officials
from exploiting the central budget. This might mean seizing control
of the local budgetary process, as occurs when financial control
boards are appointed, 3 ' permitting the sale of local assets and the
rejection of contracts, or otherwise placing the locality into
receivership.'32 It is in this sense that Kimhi concludes that states
occupy the best position relative to residents or creditors to address the
consequences of financial distress.'33
Nevertheless, there is little reason to believe that central
governments, especially states, will choose optimally in determining
whether or how to respond to a local fiscal crisis. From a legal
perspective, the state might lack adequate tools. And even if it
possesses those tools, the political economy of fiscal distress may
impede the state's ability to deploy them. Take the legal issue first.
States may be more restricted than the federal government in the
relief that they can provide, at least after fiscal distress has
materialized, because legislatively imposed compromises of existing
debts could impair the obligation of contracts in violation of the
Contracts Clause.'" The Contracts Clause claim against state
intervention may be less compelling than is commonly thought.
McConnell-Picker suggests that a state-enacted municipal
bankruptcy act as applied to subsequently enacted debts would not
violate the Contracts Clause, because the act, as all preexisting law,
would be incorporated into the executed contract."' Moreover, as
McConnell-Picker indicates, the Supreme Court took a pragmatic
view of the scope of an unconstitutional impairment in the postDepression case of FaitouteIron & Steel Co v City of Asbury Park."

131 See Kimhi, 88 BU L Rev at 670-72 (cited in note 17); Note, 110 Harv L Rev at 734
(cited in note 120).
132 See, for example, Mich Comp Laws Ann § 141.1515(4); Amdursky and Gillette,
Municipal Debt Finance Law at 246-51,255-58 (cited in note 26).
133 See Kimhi, 88 BU L Rev at 664-72, 683-84 (cited in note 17).
134 The Contracts Clause provides that "No State shall ... pass any ...Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts." US Const Art I, § 10, cl 1.
135 See McConnell and Picker, 60 U Chi L Rev at 479-81 (cited in note 14), citing Ogden v
Saunders,25 US (12 Wheat) 213, 262 (1827).
136 316 US 502 (1942).
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There, the Court upheld against a Contracts Clause claim New
Jersey's efforts to convert outstanding debts to bonds payable at a
later time and at a lower interest rate.'37 The Court reasoned that
there was no effective mechanism by which bondholders could
enforce their original obligations. As a result, the state scheme that
promised later payment did not impair an obligation that was, as a
practical matter, unenforceable." Section 903 of the Bankruptcy Act
effectively overrules the specific holding of Faitoute by prohibiting
states from prescribing a method of indebtedness of a municipality
that binds nonconsenting creditors.'39 But the rationale of Faitoute
seems consistent with other cases that indicate that altering the
security for indebtedness will not impair the obligation of contracts if
the new security leaves the creditor in no worse position than it
would have occupied with the original security. Post-Faitoute
Contracts Clause jurisprudence, which makes it more difficult for
governments to modify their own obligations than those of private
entities and which requires more than localized financial difficulties
before impairment is permitted, could nevertheless frustrate state
compromises of debt obligations.'" Recent Contracts Clause cases
demonstrate that plaintiffs must bear a significant burden in
demonstrating that a technical impairment of a governmental
contract also rises to the unconstitutional level because it lacks
reasonableness or necessity to accomplish a governmental purpose.'
While the limitations imposed on states by § 903 and uncertainty
about the consequences of the Contracts Clause for state
intervention give pause to state efforts to diminish creditor rights,
bailouts that assure full payment to creditors provide an
unquestioned means by which states can proceed to provide relief to
distressed cities. Moreover, there are reasons to favor this form of
relief over the alternatives of a federal bailout or federal bankruptcy.
Relative to the federal government, states, which tend to exercise
plenary power over their localities on fiscal matters, stand in a
relatively good position to limit localities' capacity to become
distressed or to address the situation of those localities that do
become distressed. Unlike the federal government, and absent any
federal or state constitutional restraint on its authority, a state can
Id at 507.
Id at 514-16.
139 See 11 USC § 903(1).
140 See, for example, United States Trust Co of New York v New Jersey, 431 US 1,17-21, 32 (1977).
141 See, for example, United Automobile, Aerospace, Agricultural Implement Workers of
America InternationalUnion v Fortuho, 633 F3d 37, 42-45 (lst Cir 2011).
137
138
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create, destroy, empower, or disempower localities at will.' 2 The
existence of statutory schemes to withhold advanced funds, create
financial control boards, and place localities in receivership
demonstrates that states have exercised their plenary authority to
extract substantial concessions from distressed cities in return for
state assistance, and thus to produce substantial ex ante effects on
local officials who value retaining political power.
It is unlikely, however, that states will use their plenary
authority in a manner that optimally imposes fiscal discipline on
otherwise profligate localities. There are numerous reasons for state
shortfalls in this area. First, the fact that a state bailout signals
willingness to rescue local officials whose bad bets create financial
distress may make state officials reluctant to entertain demands from
even destitute municipalities. That concern may explain some of the
efforts that states have made credibly to commit against bailouts of
distressed localities. For instance, from time to time, some state
constitutions have contained provisions that prohibit bailouts of
municipalities.' 3 Those provisions, however, have disappeared, again
revealing the inability of central governments credibly to commit
against bailout.
Second, if major or multiple cities within a state are facing fiscal
distress, it is likely that the state faces a similar situation and has
limited capacity to assist its localities. Currently, for instance,
California, Illinois, and New York are widely reported as being in
worse financial condition than their major cities and thus have
resisted local claims for assistance.'" Residents of nondistressed cities
who face resource adjustments to finance state deficits will likely feel
little sympathy for assisting what they perceive as profligate localities
within the state.
Third, to the extent that localities incur burdensome obligations
due to political pressures, there is little reason to believe that states
are immune from similar influences and would therefore act to
reduce those obligations. Experience reveals that states and localities
enter into negotiations to determine the scope and conditions of
state aid.' 5 This occurs notwithstanding the plenary power that states

City of Trenton v State of New Jersey, 262 US 182, 185-87 (1923).
See McConnell and Picker, 60 U Chi L Rev at 442 (cited in note 14).
144 See, for example, Mary Williams Walsh, Cities in Debt Turn to States, Adding Strain,
NY Times B1 (Oct 5, 2010); David Wessel, Local Debts Defy Easy Solution, Wall St J A2 (Sept
23, 2010).
145 See Fuchs, Mayors and Money at 88-91 (cited in note 105); Michelle Kaske, Rendell Urges
Harrisburgagainst Bankruptcy, Bond Buyer (June 10, 2010), online at httpJ/www.bondbuyer.com
142
143
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exercise over their localities and that allows states to impose
conditions unilaterally. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, for instance,
recently rejected a state-authorized plan for relief of fiscal distress,
even though the state could thereafter withhold local funds.'" The
opposing city officials presumably believed that they could obtain
better terms in further negotiations. Bargaining between the state
and the city is precisely what the New York Court of Appeals
anticipated would be the consequence of its decision to invalidate
the state's moratorium on New York City debt payments. The court
did not require immediate compensation of the City's debtholders.
Rather, it took note of efforts by the city and state to resolve the
crisis and concluded that the imminent meeting of the legislature
would allow it "to treat with the city's problems and to seek a fiscal
solution in the light of the holding in this case....7 Political processes,
however, reduce the likelihood that bargaining between local and
state officials produces an optimal balance, because many of the
interests that generate local fiscal excess also have substantial
influence at the state level. Some of the pension obligations that
threaten to overwhelm New York City's budget, for instance, are a
consequence of state-imposed requirements,'4 presumably because
public-sector unions have proven as effective at the state as at the
local level. Political pressures may also allow local officials who wish
to protect their domain and who are sufficiently connected to state
officials through party politics or otherwise to push back against
proposed constraints on local authority as the price of state
assistance.
Fourth, there is little reason to believe that the state has an
interest in ensuring that its localities have an optimal amount of
taxing authority. Vertical tax competition constrains the ability of
states to tax for their own purposes. Mobile residents and potential
residents of the state are likely to be more attentive to their total tax
bill than to the breakdown of whether the taxing authority emanates
from the local, state, or federal level. Especially during times of
financial distress, state officials are likely to consider every dollar
/issues/119_359/harrisburg-1013339-1.html (visited Nov 17, 2011); Walsh and Robertson, Just
before the Deadline, NY Times at B1 (cited in note 90).
146 Paul Burton, HarrisburgRips Up Its Blueprintfor Recovery, Bond Buyer at 1 (cited in
note 7).
147 Flushing National Bank v Municipal Assistance Corp, 358 NE2d 848, 855 (NY 1976).
148 See NY Const Art V, § 7 (protecting pension and retirement systems from any form of
diminishment or impairment); NY Retire & Soc Sec Law § 113 (prohibiting local
municipalities from creating new retirement funds, but also preventing them from modifying
existing funds).
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taxable at the local level as a dollar that the state cannot tax."' As a
result, states may not confer on localities the full taxing power
necessary to escape fiscal distress. Instead, both tax competition and
unfunded mandates exemplify Roderick Hills's observation that
states are likely to expand their jurisdiction beyond the optimal
point.'"
Certainly the history of municipal fiscal distress offers little
assurance that states will respond with solutions that optimally
control municipal finances. Instead, that history reveals a wide array
of responses in which states-the Contracts Clause notwithstandingfrequently facilitate municipal efforts to reduce the creditors' claims
rather than provide bailouts. New York State's initial response to
New York City's 1975 fiscal distress was to enact a moratorium on
actions to enforce the city's outstanding short-term obligations,
except for holders who exchanged their notes for an equal principal
amount of long-term bonds issued by the Municipal Assistance
Corporation for the City of New York."' During the Depression,
states similarly sought to defer obligations of their cities, for
example, through an exchange for bonds of different maturities.'52 In
the nation's largest default on municipal bonds, states in the Pacific
Northwest did not discourage the eighty-eight municipalities that
challenged the validity of contracts under which billions of dollars
were owed to finance mothballed nuclear power plants.'53 Shifting
risk to creditors with the state's implicit approval appears to be a
time-honored strategy. Monkkonen's history of late nineteenthcentury local debt reveals a variety of mechanisms for avoiding
volitionally incurred obligations, ranging from claims that the bonds
were invalid to state reorganization of debtor municipalities that
amounted to repudiation of the preexisting locality's debt."
Monkkonen's analysis leads him to two conclusions. First, "state and

149

See

Howard

Chernick,

Adam

Langley,

and

Andrew

Reschovsky,

Revenue

Diversification and the Financing of Large American Central Cities *24-28 (University of
Wisconsin-Madison, La Follette School of Public Affairs Working Paper No 2010-022, Oct
2010), online at http://www.lafollette.wisc.edulpublications/workingpapers/reschovsky2010022.pdf (visited Nov 17, 2011).
150 Roderick M. Hills Jr, Compared to What? Tiebout and the Comparative Merits of
Congress and the States in ConstitutionalFederalism, in William A. Fischel, ed, The Tiebout
Model at Fifty: Essays in Public Economics in Honor of Wallace Oates 239, 248 (Lincoln
Institute of Land Policy 2006).
151Lachman and Polner, Hugh Carey at 162-64 (cited in note 89).
152 See Faitoute,316 US at 504-07.
153 See Chemical Bank v Washington Public Power Supply System, 666 P2d 329, 342-43
(Wash 1983) (en banc).
154 See Monkkonen, The Local State at 81-101 (cited in note 12)
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local governments frequently colluded against the debt holders'

interests" by voting cities out of existence. 5 Second, "in general, the
determination of defaults was political, not fiscal.' ' .6 State officials

did not refuse bailouts to impose fiscal discipline on their cities; they
did so because they were able to impose losses on bondholders with

relative impunity, compared to what they might suffer at the hands
of the electorate if state funds were used to rescue profligate local
officials. Creditors or corrupt officials were often blamed for
imposing on unsuspecting municipalities obligations that were either
unaffordable or for which the promised projects had never
materialized, so that the absence of political will to satisfy obligations

was justified by the assumed mendacity of creditors.'5
It is not clear that states would exhibit similar antipathy toward

creditors today. Fear of contagion and the existence of a more
sophisticated securities market could lead state officials to be more

solicitous of demands for repayment than has been the case in the
past. But that does not mean that states will provide optimal relief to
localities. Political relationships between state and local officials may
lead either to too much sympathy for local plight or to the

attribution of too much blame. For example, reactions to the current
fiscal distress of cities suggest both state concerns that local officials
have been overly attentive to public sector labor unions and local

concerns that the state has hampered attempts to control labor
costs.' Perhaps that should not be surprising, given consistent
findings that municipal fiscal distress is itself often a function of
political decisions. '" That is not to suggest that states should have full
control over the fiscal conduct of localities." It is to suggest only that

state efforts to resolve municipal fiscal distress are vulnerable to
political resistance of local officials, and local officials can exploit
155 Id at 79. See also id at 24 (describing how the city of Duluth and the Minnesota state
legislature used legal maneuvers to cheat the city's bondholders of the early 1870s out of any
hope of full debt recovery).
156 Id at 76.
157 See text accompanying notes 10-12. See also Walsh and Robertson, Just before
Deadline, NY Times at B1 (cited in note 90); Monkkonen, The Local State at 57-77 (cited in
note 12).
158 For examples of restrictions on the ability of states to negotiate labor agreements with
public sector unions, see 2011 Mich Comp Laws Ann § 141.1519(1)(k)(iv); 2011 Wis Laws § 10;
David W. Chen, To Save Money, Mayor Urges Overhaul of City Pension Rules, NY Times Al
(Feb 3, 2011).
159 See Shefter, Political Crisis at 7-12 (cited in note 41); Kimhi, 88 BU L Rev at 671-72
(cited in note 17).
160 Indeed, I have argued to the contrary. See Clayton P. Gillette, Who Should Authorize
a Commuter Tax?, 77 U Chi L Rev 223, 248 (2010); Gillette, 86 Denver U L Rev at 1261 (cited
in note 79).
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that vulnerability. If, as suggested above, the federal government has
a sufficient interest in the resolution of municipal distress, then
perhaps federal actors can neutralize the states' vulnerability,
notwithstanding principles of federalism or local autonomy that
might initially be thought to preclude federal intervention. The next
Section explores how that vulnerability has particular consequences
in bankruptcy and how expansion of federal bankruptcy authority
can serve as an antidote.
III. THE STRATEGIC USE OF MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY

A.

Local Incentives to Exploit Bankruptcy

If conditions attached to bailouts are unlikely to impose fiscal
discipline on otherwise profligate localities, then one might conclude
that a regime along the lines of Chapter 9 provides an alternative
safety valve that offers an orderly mechanism for adjusting the debts
of distressed municipalities. The costs of default would then be
shared by creditors and municipal residents, and the threat of such
costs would arguably bring some fiscal discipline to subnational
governments, as it would induce greater monitoring by the groups at
risk.'1 Perhaps more importantly, under some circumstances, local
officials might prefer bankruptcy to bailouts. That conclusion might
initially seem anomalous, because a locality that has defaulted on its
debts or entered bankruptcy is likely to pay a premium when it
returns to the credit markets and is likely to suffer some
retrenchment during the bankruptcy process. 2 But if current local
officials predict little need to return to capital markets in the near
future, and if adversely affected claimants against the municipal
treasury are primarily nonresident bondholders rather than, for
example, public employees, current local officials are likely
(assuming only imperfect capitalization of future interest costs' 3) to
discount the effects of future higher credit costs in favor of the
political benefits of favoring residents. Even if the locality does have
Creditor incentives for monitoring, however, are low, given that the stakes of any
individual bondholder are likely to be too small to warrant monitoring, and institutional
creditors can, at lower cost, reduce risk by diversification. See Gillette, 50 Wm & Mary L Rev
at 975-81 (cited in note 76).
162 See Campbell Robertson and Mary Williams Walsh, Debt Crisis? Bankruptcy Fears?
See Jefferson County, Ala., NY Times A13 (July 30, 2011); Stowe and Maloney, The Response
of the Debt Market at *20-21 (cited in note 97).
163 This assumption is consistent with the literature. See Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint
on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 Colum L
Rev 473, 521-28 (1991).
161
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to return to credit markets relatively soon, the possibility of a
postbankruptcy premium will not necessarily discourage local
officials from filing for relief, since the effects on any one constituent
are likely to be minimal. Indeed, because the filing of the bankruptcy
petition would impose a stay on collection efforts by creditors," local
officials could also prefer bankruptcy to forestall any legal claims
that they adjust resources in order to pay creditors. Since § 904 of the
Bankruptcy Code allows local officials to maintain control of taxing
and spending decisions during bankruptcy, officials may believe that
bankruptcy insulates them from the imposition of obligations that
they find politically, if not financially, imprudent.
The most important protection that bankruptcy provides local
officials, however, may be shelter from the state. As I suggested
earlier, state bailouts are likely to be politically costly to local
officials, especially if intervention entails withholding state funds to
reimburse advances'" or formal takeovers by state officials.'" Federal
officials conditioned the 1975 federal guarantee of New York City
debt on the creation of state oversight boards for the city.6 7 In
subsequent years, the secretary of the treasury explicitly committed
to provide federal aid for the city only if state authority over its
finances continued, and implicitly threatened that additional loan
guarantee legislation was contingent on concessions by city
employees that would otherwise have been a subject of bargaining
(and political support for) with local officials.'" Ed Koch, former
mayor of New York City, was quoted as objecting to state control of
the city's finances: "if I [had been] the Mayor [at the time], I would
never have gone along with it: I don't think I could have accepted a
state of affairs that made me one-seventh of a mayor... 9 Then-Mayor
Abraham Beame is reported to have seriously considered resigning
in the face of the dilution of his authority by the demands of state
officials and the state-created Municipal Assistance Corporation that
he impose a unilateral wage freeze on city workers, impose an
increase in subway fares, eliminate free tuition for the City
University of New York, slash capital spending, and institute
bookkeeping reforms."' Nassau County's governing board recently
reacted to a financial takeover by a state-created control board by
M

164 See 11 USC §§ 362(a). This provision is incorporated into Chapter 9 by 11 USC § 901(a).
165

See, for example, Va Code § 15.2-2659.

166 See Note, 110 Harv L Rev at 735-38 (cited in note 120).
167

Shefter, PoliticalCrisis at 166-67 (cited in note 41).

168 Id at 167.
169
170

Soffer, Ed Koch at 120 (cited in note 104).
See Lachman and Polner, Hugh Carey at 111-12, 121 (cited in note 89).
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initiating an action to declare the effort unconstitutional.'7 ' New
Jersey responded to fiscal distress in Camden by placing the city
under direct state supervision, forcing on the city a business
administrator named by the state, and shifting from the city to a
state-nominated chief operating officer the power to make financial
and personnel decisions.'" Recent amendments to Michigan's process
for appointing emergency financial managers for municipalities
entail the power to reject existing contracts, including collective
bargaining agreements,'" a power that the appointed manager for the
Detroit Public Schools has exercised to reduce wages and benefits.'"
At least as a formal matter, the combination of the automatic stay
and the nonintervention principle in bankruptcy could preclude
similar assumptions of control. For instance, the court conducting
Jefferson County's bankruptcy proceedings recently rejected claims
that it abstain from interfering with a state court receivership of the
county and lift the automatic stay in favor of state proceedings.7 '
As I have indicated, however, the risk of contagion and of
signaling systemic problems means that a municipal bankruptcy
filing is not innocuous from the federal or state perspective. Thus,
central government officials might prefer bailouts to municipal
default and bankruptcy. Certainly that should be the case where
bailout is accompanied by severe restrictions on municipal autonomy
that minimize the moral hazard associated with rescue. These
different preferences of municipal and centralized officials set up a
strategic game in which municipal officials can make credible threats
to impose substantial costs on centralized officials. While the first
preference for states might be a bailout with strong concessions from
the locality concerning its internal fiscal operations, the second
preference for the state fearful of contagion would be a bailout with
weaker concessions, while the last preference would be a bankruptcy
filing that could cause contagion and signal systemic difficulties.
Local officials have quite different preferences. Because local
officials wish to retain political authority, their least preferred option
will likely be a bailout with strong concessions. Again, local officials
may prefer a bankruptcy filing even to bailout with weak
171 See County of Nassau v Nassau County Interim FinanceAuthority, 920 NYS2d 873,
883-84 (NY S Ct 2011).
172 Howard Gillette Jr, Camden after the Fall: Decline and Renewal in a Post-industrial
City 196 (Pennsylvania 2005).
173 Mich Comp Laws Ann § 141.1519(1)(k).
174 See Jennifer Chambers, DPS Cuts Pay; Union Vows Fight: Contract Override to Spark

Challenge of Roberts' Powers under New Law, Detroit News Al (July 30, 2011).
175 See generally In re Jefferson County, 2012 WL 32921 (Bankr ND Ala).
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concessions, because bankruptcy costs can often be externalized. But
even if local officials prefer weak concessions to bankruptcy, the
plausible argument that they prefer bankruptcy in order to retain
political authority over their constituents gives local officials a
credible threat to deploy the bankruptcy option unless the state
agrees to only moderate concessions. In short, local officials can
exploit the preferences of centralized officials for bailout over
bankruptcy by threatening to take the latter measure unless
centralized officials accede to only moderate rather than severe
conditions for the former.
Indeed, it is plausible that a state's desire to avoid strategic use
of municipal bankruptcy explains why only about half the states have
enacted statutes consenting to the filing of bankruptcy petitions by
their municipalities. That phenomenon might initially seem puzzling
because, given the states' incapacity or failure to enact state schemes
for adjusting debts that can bind nonconsenting creditors,'76 federal
bankruptcy might be an appropriate solution to municipal fiscal
distress, even from a state's perspective. At least that may be the
case either for truly destitute cities or for situations in which state aid
is unavailing. Of course, some states may not have enacted the
necessary statutes solely out of inertia. No widespread municipal
crisis that might induce legislative action has materialized in the
seventy-five years subsequent to the enactment of federal
bankruptcy law governing municipalities. The requirement of
specific authorization has existed only since 1994. Before that time,
general state provisions, such as home rule grants and the power to
sue and be sued, may have been thought sufficient. If inertia alone
explains the uneven enactment of the necessary legislation, it is
plausible that the current crisis could stimulate additional state
legislation. The Indiana legislature, for instance, has not heretofore
granted the required consent but recently had the necessary bill
before it.'"
There may, however, be more considered reasons for state
inaction. States may resist conceding to federal courts the authority
to affect municipal finances by confirming debt adjustment plans that
could have statewide effects. Alternatively, states might simply
maintain that any degree of federal intervention (other than
bailouts) in the financial affairs of their municipalities violates
See 11 USC § 903.
See Karen Pierog, Indiana Bill Would Allow Municipal Bankruptcy, Thomson Reuters
News & Insight (Dec 29, 2010), online at http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Bankruptcy
/News/2010/12-_December/Indiana_bill_would_allow municipalbankruptcy/ (visited Nov 17,2011).
176
177
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constitutional

principles of federalism."8 But perhaps a more

important impediment to state consent is the risk that states face
from the strategic use of bankruptcy proceedings. Indeed, concerns
about strategic behavior by Harrisburg perhaps explain why the
Pennsylvania legislature, which had previously authorized its
political subdivisions to file petitions under Chapter 9 with the
approval of the State Department of Internal Affairs,'79 has recently
enacted legislation that temporarily forbids such filings by certain
cities, including Harrisburg.'" Nevertheless, the Harrisburg City
Council subsequently did file for bankruptcy, in part out of
displeasure with a state-supported plan to have the city sell or lease
assets.'8' If concern that municipalities will engage in strategic
behavior causes states to eschew the benefits of Chapter 9, then
elimination of the municipalities' credible threat could lead to more
widespread and useful adoption of the bankruptcy option by states
that have heretofore resisted granting municipalities that authority.
One might respond that if states actually have this concern, then
we should see more bargaining around the bankruptcy option than
we do. Of course, if such bargaining is rare, it may be a consequence
of the relatively low degree of municipal fiscal distress, and thus of
opportunities for strategic use of bankruptcy, since the enactment of
178 States, that is, may retain some of the sense of sovereignty that led the Georgia
legislature, after the Supreme Court's decision that permitted a creditor to bring an action
against that state under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, to enact a taw
"condemning to death without benefit of clergy, any marshal of the United States, or other
person, who should presume to serve any process against that State at the suit of an individual."
William A. Scott, The Repudiation of State Debts: A Study in the FinancialHistory of Mississippi,
Florida, Alabama, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Louisiana, Arkansas, Tennessee,
Minnesota, Michigan, and Virginia 11 (Crowell 1893) (internal quotations omitted).
179 53 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 5571.
180 The same legislation also threatens any city that does file with a loss of state funds.
72 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1601-D.l:

(a) Scope of article. This section applies to a city of the third class which is determined to
be financially distressed under section 203 of the act of July 10, 1987 (P.L. 246, No. 47),
known as the Municipalities Financial Recovery Act.
(b) Limitation on bankruptcy. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including
section 261 of the Municipalities Financial Recovery Act, no distressed city may file a
petition for relief under 11 U.S.C. Ch. 9 (relating to adjustment of debts of a municipality)
or any other Federal bankruptcy law, and no government agency may authorize the
distressed city to become a debtor under 11 U.S.C. Ch. 9 or any other Federal bankruptcy
law.
(c) Penalty. If a city subject to this section fails to comply with subsection (b), all
Commonwealth funding to the city shall be suspended.
(d) Expiration. This section shall expire July 1, 2012.
(internal citations omitted).
181 See Corkery and Maher, Capital Filesfor Bankruptcy, Wall St J at A3 (cited in note 8).
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Chapter 9. More important inferences might be drawn from the
interactions of states and localities in those situations where
bankruptcy actually seemed plausible. On at least some of those
occasions, local officials do appear to have exploited the bankruptcy
option. In addition to the Harrisburg situation, which reveals
substantial negotiations between the city and the state," that seems
to have been the tactic employed by the mayor of Camden, New
Jersey, who filed under Chapter 9 in order to prevent the state from
imposing additional restrictions on the fiscally distressed city."
Hamtramck, Michigan, has sought state permission to enter
bankruptcy and resisted the state appointment of an emergency
financial manager." Bridgeport's filing for bankruptcy followed

contentious and unsuccessful negotiations with the state and a stateappointed financial review board about measures to address the
city's financial distress. ' Prior to default of the Urban Development
Corporation, its chairman informed New York's governor that he
intended to bring a completed bankruptcy petition to a negotiation
meeting with creditors." As I noted above, the New York City
experience similarly appears to involve the grant of aid to forestall a
threatened bankruptcy filing, although it was the federal government
rather than the state that provided the necessary assistance. 7
Certainly it is understood that municipal debtors (like corporate
debtors) may use the threat of bankruptcy to strike deals with
creditors. That arguably was the strategy employed by the
emergency financial manager of the Detroit Public Schools when he
announced that he was considering using Chapter 9 to restructure
the school system. "
If states are truly wary of municipal strategic behavior,
therefore, they may avoid consenting to the bankruptcy option.
States might be more willing to permit the bankruptcy option if they
could neutralize the credibility of the municipal threat to exercise the
bankruptcy option for strategic purposes. It is at that point that the
explicit grant of judicial authority to impose resource adjustments on
bankrupt municipalities becomes useful. Since the source of the
See id. See also Kaske, Rendell Urges Harrisburgagainst Bankruptcy (cited in note 145).
See Gillette, Camden after the Fall at 195 (cited in note 172).
184 See Kate Linebaugh, Tax Dispute Squeezes Detroit'sNeighbor, Wall St J A6 (Dec 20,2010).
185 See Dorothy A. Brown, FiscalDistress and Politics: The Bankruptcy Filing of Bridgeport
182
183

as a Case Study in Reclaiming Local Sovereignty, 11 Bankr Dev J 625, 634-37 (1995).
186 See Lachman and Polner, Hugh Carey at 88 (cited in note 89).
187 See text accompanying notes 100-07.
188 See Alex P. Kellogg, Detroit Schools on the Brink-Shrinking District Heads toward
Bankruptcy to Gain Controlof Its Costs, Wall St J A3 (July 21, 2009).
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credible threat is the preservation of local officials' political
autonomy in § 904, the ideal remedy is to make the level of local
officials' authority inside and outside bankruptcy more similar.
Explicitly allowing bankruptcy courts more discretion over the
debtor municipality's financial situation than § 904 currently permits
serves that function. Just as states can override local political
decisions outside bankruptcy, so modification of § 904 might allow
bankruptcy courts to override those decisions when lack of political
will rather than destitution explains local resistance to resource
adjustments. Equivalence of the two situations means that local
officials would be more likely to condition the decision to file under
Chapter 9 on the destitution of the municipality and actual need for
debt adjustment rather than on the exercise of political will or the
officials' own comparative political position. Presumably, and subject
to some caveats I note below, this change would not deter truly
destitute municipalities from taking advantage of the benefits of
Chapter 9. The court would have few incentives to impose excessive
resource adjustments on such a municipality, as one can get only so
much blood from a stone. Local officials who feared affordable
resource adjustments within bankruptcy would not likely be deterred
from exercising that option, even if courts could explicitly impose
them, because those localities would face the same result outside
Chapter 9 by virtue of state control.
B.

State Self-Help against Municipal Opportunism

A potential response is that states can already protect
themselves against strategic bankruptcy while permitting appropriate
filings, so additional judicial authority to accomplish that objective is
superfluous. Recall that entry into bankruptcy is conditional on state
approval. In theory, therefore, states could restrict the use of
bankruptcy by the municipality and therefore the credibility of
municipal threats to externalize significant costs.
If states gave ad hoc consent to bankruptcy filings, that strategy
might work. Some states do, in fact, follow a procedure that requires
a municipality to obtain the consent of a state official prior to filing a
petition under Chapter 9.' Alternatively, the state could oppose the

189 For instance, Michigan localities can file for Chapter 9 only under the supervision of
an emergency financial manager who is appointed to deal with the fiscal distress of a particular
municipality. Mich Comp Laws Ann § 141.1222. Under the new act, Mich Comp Laws Ann
§ 141.1523, a state-appointed emergency manager may file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy only after
she determines that no reasonable alternative exists, provides a written recommendation to the
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filing in court. Connecticut took just that tack in the bankruptcy of
Bridgeport, " and its opposition may have been influential in the
court's determination that Bridgeport did not qualify for insolvency.
Even in those cases, however, the explanations that I provided above
for suboptimal responses by states confronted with municipal fiscal
distress suggest that states may be concerned about municipal
strategic behavior, since several of those explanations focused on the
political interactions of states and their political subdivisions. Other
states have enacted less restrictive authorizations that leave the
bankruptcy filing decision solely within the discretion of the
distressed municipality. ' Those statutes may reveal a concern that
any statutory obstacles that protect against strategic bankruptcies
simultaneously reduce the availability of Chapter 9 to address
situations where it would be useful, but where additional statutory
conditions either could not satisfied or could only be satisfied with
the expenditure of substantial time and resources. Thus, it may be
rational for states not only to be more receptive to the possibility of
Chapter 9 if they could reduce the threat of strategic behavior, but
also to opt for broader authorization statutes.
C.

Limitations on the Judicial Power to Impose Resource
Adjustments

I have suggested that allowing federal bankruptcy judges to
impose resource adjustments on defaulting municipalities that
appear to lack political will as opposed to financial resources can
serve the dual purposes of vindicating central governments' interest
in alleviating local fiscal distress and minimizing local use of
bankruptcy for strategic purposes. Of course, this solution assumes
two characteristics of judicial proceedings, each of which is
contestable. First, it assumes that bankruptcy courts have both the
institutional capacity and the incentives to distinguish between true
destitution and lack of political will, a determination that depends
heavily on judicial discernment of the peak of a municipality's
revenue hill." It is by no means clear that courts have the
institutional capacity to gauge accurately the current or future
financial position of municipalities. The required analysis, however,
governor and state treasurer, and receives written approval from the governor. New Jersey
requires the consent of the state's municipal finance commission. NJ Stat Ann § 52:27-40.
190 See Brown, 11 Bankr Dev J at 638 (cited in note 185).
191 See, for example, Cal Gov Code § 53760; Fla Stat Ann § 218.01.
192 For a detailed analysis of the econometric calculation of a municipality's revenue hill,
see Haughwout, et al, 86 Rev Econ & Stat at 570-72 (cited in note 10).
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is not much different from current requirements that the court
determine the "insolvency" of the petitioning municipality, since the
prospective test inherent in that evaluation also requires the court to
determine the future financial status of the municipality.'" Indeed,
since the court would essentially have to demonstrate that resource
adjustments were affordable before imposing them, an explicit
finding to that effect, presumably supported with transparent
findings of financial wherewithal, would be preferable to one that
was made under the relatively vague standard that the filing locality
was not insolvent.
Second, and perhaps more problematic, allowing courts to
impose resource adjustments opens up prospects for more intrusive
violations of the noninterference principle. For example, if a court
can impose resource adjustments in bankruptcy in order to optimize
tax rates or service levels, why can it not similarly require that a city
council be elected on an at-large basis rather than a district basis in
order to reduce the fiscal consequences of logrolling that account for
inefficient local expenditures? " Once bankruptcy courts become an
appropriate arbiter of some aspects of municipal organization, it is
more difficult to argue that the shibboleth of federalism becomes an
adequate response to such questions. Thus, the grant of a right to
impose resource adjustments implies the exercise of a host of judicial
powers in the name of protecting the federal and state interests in
local financial health.
Of course, the issue may be an empty one. If I am correct about
the strategic use of bankruptcy, then the very creation of a judicial
right to impose resource adjustments may decrease the need for its
exercise. If only localities that lack political will fall subject to
judicial imposition of resource adjustments, then the availability of
that option is likely to strengthen political will. True, some local
officials may prefer that judges, rather than they, bear formal
responsibility for resource adjustments, so that the officials can
subsequently blame courts for high taxes and low services. Officials
of that mindset may still prefer bankruptcy filings to imposing their
own resource adjustments. But local officials who wish to retain
political authority are likely to prefer to retain the discretion over
whom to tax and what to cut rather than risk alienating political
allies by leaving those decisions in judicial hands. Thus, local officials
who perceive the inevitability of resource adjustments are likely to
193

See text accompanying notes 45-51.
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favor a forum in which they can fashion the remedy themselves or
political negotiations with state officials rather than have it imposed
by courts. That may be all to the good if the state is, indeed, best
positioned to reach an overall solution to any locality's fiscal
difficulties. Nudging the locality into the state's procedures does not
ensure optimal solutions to municipal fiscal distress. As I have
suggested, state processes are likely both to be subject to political
economy explanations that give either local officials or creditors
disproportionate power in working out relief plans and to be
indifferent to implications for the federal fiscal commons. But
adjustments to bankruptcy law can at least allow states to enter that
bargain with less concern that municipalities can credibly threaten to
exploit the bankruptcy option.
IV. A NOTE ON STRATEGIC USE OF BANKRUPTCY BY THE STATES

It is, perhaps, worthwhile to close with a brief note on the
current debate about whether Chapter 9 or some equivalent should
be expanded to permit states, as well as municipalities, to adjust their
debts through some federal statutory scheme.'9' Some congressmen
have taken up the call and are reported to be drafting legislation that
would implement a bankruptcy scheme for states.'" In this Article, I
have focused on municipal bankruptcy. But the problems of political
will and fiscal federalism obviously affect the federal-state
relationship as well as the federal-state-municipal one. Indeed,
because states are more likely to fall within the too-big-to-fail
category than most cities, the likelihood of federal intervention in
the event of state fiscal distress is even greater than in the case of
municipal distress. One might point to the counterexample of the
federal government's explicit refusal to assume the debts of
distressed states in the 1840s.'" That example, however, seems dated
in today's financial environment. In the 1840s, one-third of the states
had little or no debt and thus would receive no benefit from federal
assumption."98 The states, rather than the federal government,

195 For an example of one argument in that debate, see David A. Skeel Jr, States of
Bankruptcy, 79 U Chi L Rev (forthcoming 2012).
196 See Jeb Bush and Newt Gingrich, Better Off Bankrupt: States Need a New Way to Deal
with Budget Crises, LA Times 19 (Jan 27, 2011); Mary Williams Walsh, A Path Is Sought for
States to Escape Their Debt Burdens, NY Times Al (Jan 21, 2011).

See Wibbels, 36 Comp Polit Stud at 490-91, 497-98 (cited in note 92).
See id at 493-94 & table 1 (noting that seven of the twenty-seven states had zero debt,
while two had less than $1million in debt).
197
198
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typically funded capital projects.' According to the Treasury
Department, the federal debt between 1840 and 1842 ranged
between $3.5 million and $13.5 million;' in 1841, each of eight states
had debts in excess of $10 million, with Louisiana just under $24
million?" The divergence among states and reduced federal debt
plausibly limited any contagion effect from the default of a distressed
state.
As a consequence, the federal government cannot and probably
should not credibly commit not to bail out states or political
subdivisions when their failure would generate the same kinds of
contagion that the recent federal rescue of financial institutions was
intended to avoid. Credit markets likely apply a positive value to the
probability of a federal bailout of states, just as they applied a
positive value to the probability of a federal bailout of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, notwithstanding the absence of any legal
obligation.2'2

Bankruptcy along the lines of Chapter 9, therefore, might be a
plausible solution for a financially distressed state. But, assuming
that any statutory solution embodied the equivalent of the current
§ 904, it would also create the same strategic possibility in the
federal-state relationship as I have discussed above in the municipalstate relationship. Possible contagion effects of state defaults would
cause the federal government to favor bailouts over bankruptcy.
Presumably the federal government would prefer any such bailout of
a state to be accompanied by commitments to future fiscal discipline,
just as the federal government attempted to do in the case of New
York City. State officials, on the other hand, would presumably
prefer a low level of commitment. Any state bankruptcy law,
therefore, should include consideration of the possibility that states
could exploit the threat of bankruptcy to extract concessions in a
federal bailout, just as I have suggested localities can do and have
done in the context of Chapter 9.

For a discussion of how state infrastructure investment contributed to the debt crisis of
the 1840s, see William B. English, Understanding the Costs of Sovereign Default.: American
State Debts in the 1840's, 86 Am Econ Rev 259, 263-66 (1996).
200 Department of the Treasury, Historical Debt Outstanding-Annual1791-1849 (TreasuryDirect
2008), online at httpJ/www.treasurydirectgov/govtreportspd/histdebt/histdebt_histol.htm (visited Nov
18,2011).
201 Wibbels, 36 Comp Polit Stud at 494 table 1 (cited in note 92).
202 See McLean and Nocera, All the Devils Are Here at 353 (cited in note 22).
199
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CONCLUSION

From the perspective of fiscal federalism, municipal fiscal
distress raises three different problems that implicate municipal
bankruptcy. The first is the moral hazard problem that is involved
whenever one entity-here, more centralized governments-has the
capacity and the incentive to rescue another entity-a more
second problem involves
decentralized
government. The
externalities. Municipal distress imposes significant costs on other
jurisdictions, and the presence of those spillovers provides
opportunities for strategic behavior, as the distressed locality can
demand assistance from adversely affected entities. Third, fiscal
distress exacerbates agency costs. While rational municipal residents
might be willing to accept the largesse of more centralized
governments both in subsidizing municipal expenditures and in
imposing conditions on rescue, municipal officials may disregard
residents' interests by overgrazing on a centralized commons and by
threatening to impose externalities in order to reduce the personal
costs of centralized relief. Obviously, these problems are related.
The tendency of municipal officials to overextend their localities
increases the possibility that some form of rescue will be necessary,
and the externalities caused by fiscal distress imply that political
pressure will be brought on those governments capable of providing
assistance to do so. I have suggested that one prophylactic measure
against these distortions is to explicitly permit bankruptcy courts to
impose resource adjustments. Doing so forces municipal residents
and local officials-both of whom might otherwise reject additional
financial burdens out of a lack of political will or a desire to extract
concessions from centralized governments-to internalize the costs
of their activities. The result would be that local officials would gain
less from efforts to shift the avoidable losses of fiscal distress to
creditors and would be more likely to accede to optimal agreements
with central officials for the resolution of fiscal distress.

